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ABSTRACT
Research on cyber-behavioral biometric authentication has traditionally as­
sumed naive (or zero-effort) impostors who make no attem pt to generate sophisticat­
ed forgeries of biometric samples. Given the plethora of adversarial technologies on 
the Internet, it is questionable as to whether the zero-effort threat model provides a 
realistic estimate of how these authentication systems would perform in the wake of 
adversity. To better evaluate the efficiency of these authentication systems, there is 
need for research on algorithmic attacks which simulate the state-of-the-art threats.
To tackle this problem, we took the case of keystroke and touch-based authenti­
cation and developed a new family of algorithmic attacks which leverage the intrinsic 
instability and variability exhibited by users’ behavioral biometric patterns. For both 
fixed-text (or password-based) keystroke and continuous touch-based authentication, 
we: 1) Used a wide range of pattern analysis and statistical techniques to examine 
large repositories of biometrics data for weaknesses that could be exploited by ad­
versaries to break these systems, 2) Designed algorithmic attacks whose mechanisms 
hinge around the discovered weaknesses, and 3) Rigorously analyzed the impact of 
the attacks on the best verification algorithms in the respective research domains.
When launched against three high performance password-based keystroke ver­
ification systems, our attacks increased the mean Equal Error Rates (EERs) of the 
systems by between 28.6% and 84.4% relative to the traditional zero-effort attack.
For the touch-based authentication system, the attacks performed even better, as 
they increased the system’s mean EER by between 338.8% and 1535.6% depending 
on parameters such as the failure-to-enroll threshold and the type of touch gesture 
subjected to attack. For both keystroke and touch-based authentication, we found 
that there was a small proportion of users who saw considerably greater performance 
degradation than others as a result of the attack. There was also a sub-set of users 
who were completely immune to the attacks.
Our work exposes a previously unexplored weakness of keystroke and touch- 
based authentication and opens the door to the design of behavioral biometric systems 
which are resistant to statistical attacks.
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Biometrics — a set of measurements of either the human characteristics ac­
quired naturally over time (behavioral biometrics), or the inherent physical traits of 
an individual (physiological biometrics) — have recently seen a lot of applications 
in user authentication [1, 2] and cryptographic key generation [3, 4]. The increased 
interest in biometrics has stemmed from a number of factors, key among which being 
the generally high entropy across a user population, and the elimination of the need 
for a subject to memorize a  potentially complex secret.
While physiological biometrics (e.g., fingerprints, iris patterns) are stable and 
highly unique for each user, behavioral biometrics (e.g., keystroke dynamics, handwrit­
ing, touch gestures) tend to be imprecise, in some cases exhibiting considerable intra­
user variability and overlap across users. This imprecision and variability prompts 
questions as to whether well orchestrated statistical attacks would not severely de­
grade the performance of authentication systems based on these modalities. Unfortu­
nately, the majority of research in this field seems to disregard this threat, with most 
systems being evaluated under the assumption of a naive attacker who is unable to
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pull off a sophisticated forgery. As a  result, very little is known about the resistance 
of these systems to sophisticated forgeries.
In this work, we applied a wide range of pattern analysis techniques to discover 
attack vulnerabilities in keystroke and touch biometrics data, and then developed 
a new family of algorithmic attacks that exploit the discovered weaknesses to de­
grade the performance of the two categories of authentication systems. Keystroke 
authentication — the use of keyboard typing traits to identify/authenticate users 
— is categorized into two branches, namely, fixed-text authentication [5, 6, 7] and 
continuous authentication [8, 9]. Both types of authentication classify users based 
on the way in which they type the different characters making up a string, the only 
difference being that fixed-text authentication is based on short memorized strings 
(typically passwords), while continuous authentication is based on large chunks of 
text that users type while they freely interact with the computer. The keystroke 
attacks designed in this work are targeted against fixed-text keystroke authentication 
systems.
Touch-based authentication is a form of authentication in which touch patterns 
(such as swiping, zooming and clicking/tapping on a touch screen) are used to iden­
tify/authenticate users. Like keystroke authentication, touch-based authentication 
is also categorized into two branches: “entry point” authentication and continuous 
authentication. In continuous authentication users’ touch gestures are monitored 
throughout a phone usage session [10, 11, 12]. In “entry point” authentication on the 
other hand, users are authenticated based on how they execute a  certain (possibly
3
secret) gesture at the entry point to an application or to the phone itself (i.e., login) 
[13, 14, 15]. This work focuses on continuous touch-based authentication.
For both keystroke and touch-based authentication, we first perform a statis­
tical evaluation of biometric data collected from a large population of users, before 
using the observed statistical traits to design and launch statistical attacks on users’ 
templates. In practice the keystroke statistical attack designed in this work would 
be launched with the aid of bots— a class of rogue applications that are now well 
understood to have the capacity to emulate keystrokes [16], based on programs like 
xsendkeycode [17] for the X Window system and APIs such as Sendlnput [18] for 
Microsoft Windows. Given a bot designed to mimic human typing, a motivated 
attacker who has access to a sizeable amount of users’ typing data could extract 
representative model information from one population, and use it as input to the bot 
so as to attack users’ keystroke profiles from any other population.
Since the dynamics of how a bot could generate and submit fake keystrokes 
at a verifier have been explored in recent literature [16], we do not implement a live 
bot in this study. Instead we evaluate a feature-level attack under the assumption 
of a password-keystroke co-authentication system for which the attacker has accessed 
the victim’s password, possesses the required software tools, and is only left with the 
task of synthetically generating the keystroke sequence corresponding to the user’s 
profile. Our assumption of a stolen password is not uncommon in security evaluations 
of biometrics systems “as it allows evaluators to better understand how much extra 
security the biometric adds to the strength of the password [19]”. In fact, we argue 
that on the basis of the current prevalence of attacks launched to steal authentication
data from central storage servers1, it is not unlikely that a password-keystroke system 
could be faced with adversaries who already have knowledge of the victim’s password.
To launch our statistical attack on a touch-based authentication system in 
practice, we used a  robot to execute the statistically fine-tuned touch gestures on the 
screen. While there exist a wide range of robots that could be used for this purpose, 
we assume that it would be infeasible for the adversary to use a very expensive and 
sophisticated robot (that could cost thousands of dollars) for the sake of breaking the 
security of a stolen touch screen device (e.g., phone). For this reason, we implemented 
our statistical attack using the standard Lego Mindstorms NXT robotic kit [21], a 
very cheap robot that can easily be programmed to perform swiping and clicking 
operations2. The simplicity of this robot convinces us that our attack could easily 
get embraced by adversaries if continuous touch-based authentication became widely 
deployed. Additionally, the fact that the attack is launched in the analog domain 
implies that it cannot easily be stopped by conventional software solutions like would 
be the case for malware-based attacks.
1.2 Dissertation Contributions
In this dissertation we analyze two large behavioral biometrics data reposito­
ries — one of which a keystroke dataset and the other a touch gestures dataset — for 
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by adversaries to attack the associated authen­
tication systems. We then design a family of attacks that leverage these weaknesses
1One recent example of a large-scale attack is described in [20]
2 Research on continuous touch-based authentication primarily revolves around three frequently 
occurring gestures — clicking (or tapping), swiping to move the screen vertically, and swiping to 
move the screen horizontally [10, 11])
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to break keystroke and touch-based authentication systems. Our contributions are 
described in greater detail below.
1. We design an algorithmic attack mechanism that exploits the instability of 
users’ keystroke features to degrade the performance of a keystroke biometric 
system. Relative to the zero-effort attacks typically used to test the performance 
of keystroke biometric systems, we show that our algorithmic attack increases 
the Equal Error Rates (EERs) of three high performance keystroke verifiers 
by between 28.6% and 84.4%. Our results confirm that zero-effort impostor 
testing can underestimate the threat faced by a keystroke verifier in practice, 
and demonstrate the need for the incorporation of algorithmic attacks in the 
standard impostor testing routine of keystroke verifiers.
2. We introduce the notion of robotic attacks against touch-based authentication. 
While we use a Lego robot to emphasize that these attacks could be implemented 
at minimal cost, our core contribution is not with regard to a particular robot 
type or algorithm (one could use a more sophisticated robot to launch a high 
precision attack). Rather, its the illustration that robots (in general) are 
a much more realistic performance evaluation tool (than the currently used 
methods) for the fast emerging field of touch-based authentication. Relative to 
the traditional zero-effort attack, our robotic attack increased the mean EERs 
of the verification algorithms by between 338.8% and 1535.6% depending on the 
failure to enroll threshold and the type of stroke used for classification. Further, 
we found that the impact of the attack could not be significantly reduced by a
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failure to enroll policy which bars the “poor” performing users from enrolling 
onto the system.
3. Putting aside the performance of the attacks, our work, by virtue of being the 
first to analyze the statistical attributes of a large keystroke dataset assembled 
over several years, could serve as a reference benchmark for studies that continue 
to be built around small numbers of users. This problem of keystroke research 
being predominantly based on small datasets has prompted questions on how the 
results reported from these experiments generalize to large keystroke systems in 
practice [22], and has, among other issues always called for a large-scale study 
whose findings can give some insights into the properties of keystroke data 
at scale. Our observations on the Gaussianity, discriminability and mutual 
information of keystroke features should address this gap for a number of 
research areas within keystroke.
4. Although the small size of our touch biometrics dataset (relative to the keystroke 
dataset) limits the rigor of our analysis, we present some statistics expressing 
variables such as: the regions of the screen on which most swiping is done, the 
pressure exerted on the screen, and the area of the finger touching the screen. 
These empirical results should play a role in enabling the community to better 
understand the dynamics of users’ touch behavior.
1.3 Definitions and Terminology
In this section we define the various terminologies that are central to the 
methodology used in this dissertation. Some of these terms are further described
7
when they axe first used in the dissertation.
False R e jec t R a te  (F R R ): The proportion of genuine authentication attempts that 
the authentication system classifies as impostor attempts. Elsewhere in literature, this 
term is also referred to as the False Alarm Rate.
False A ccep t R a te  (FAR): The proportion of impostor authentication attem pts 
that the authentication system classifies as genuine attempts. Elsewhere in literature, 
this term is also referred to as the Impostor Pass Rate.
E qua l E rro r  R a te  (EE R ): The error rate at which the FAR and FRR are equal. 
D e tec tio n -E rro r (D E T ) T radeoff Curve: The plot of FAR versus FRR or vice 
versa. The EER can be computed with the aid of this curve.
C lassifier (or V erifier): A program which assigns a new observation to a given 
class based on training carried out on observations whose class membership is known. 
B iom etric  tem p la te : A stored record of a user’s biometric features. During testing 
(or authentication), a new biometric sample provided by the user is compared with 
the stored template (using a classifier) so as to determine whether the new sample 
indeed belongs to the user in question.
N ull hypo thesis  (Ha): A claim that is to be subjected to a statistical test. The 
alternative hypothesis is the hypothesis contrary to the null hypothesis. Rejection of 
the null hypothesis implies acceptance of the alternative hypothesis.
Level o f significance, o r c ritica l value, a: The probability that the null hypoth­
esis is rejected when it is in fact true. It is also referred to as the Type I error.
P  value: The probability of obtaining a test statistic that is at least as extreme as 
the one that was actually observed, given that the null hypothesis is true
8
A to u ch  s tro k e  (or sw ipe): The path taken by the finger on the touch screen. These 
two are not standard terms, and could hence assume completely different meanings 
in other literature.
C y b er-b eh av io ra l b iom etrics: A class of biometric modalities in which users are 
identified based on how they interact with computing devices (e.g., desktop computers, 
phones, etc.). Examples of cyber-behavioral biometric modalities include: keystroke 
dynamics, touch behavior, web usage patterns, etc.
Zero-effort a ttack : A method of testing the performance of a biometric authentica­
tion system that uses samples generated by one user (i.e., the user designated as the 
impostor) to attack the template built for another user (i.e., the user designated as 
the genuine user, or victim). This attack method simulates a scenario in which the 
attacker does not make any attem pt to imitate the victim’s biometric footprint.
1.4 O rgan iza tion  o f th e  D isse rta tio n
In Chapter 2, we discuss the various past works which relate to the statistical 
analysis and attacks designed in this paper. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, we respectively 
discuss our data collection and feature extraction, statistical analysis and the attack 
on the keystroke system. In Chapter 6 we discuss our data collection and feature 
extraction, statistical analysis and the attack on the touch-based authentication 
system. Finally in chapter 7, we give our conclusions and some indications of future 
work.
CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Related Work and Motivation Behind Touch-based Authentication
Over the past few years, the popularity and usage of mobile devices (i.e., smart 
phones, tablets, etc.,) has grown exponentially [23]. One of the key factors for the 
proliferation of these devices—their portability relative to the desktop computer— 
also unfortunately manifests as a major weakness from the point of view of physical 
security. The ease with which these devices can be carried around in their owners’ 
pockets and (or) briefcases is the same ease with which they can be misplaced or 
stolen by adversaries. Once in the hands of a sophisticated attacker, both the 
remotely accessible resources and stored data on these devices (eg., passwords, social 
security numbers, bank details, private emails, company secrets, etc.,) could easily be 
compromised, potentially resulting into catastrophic consequences for businesses and 
(or) individuals.
Currently, the most widely employed defense against such threats is the PIN 
lock mechanism. However, this mechanism is incorrectly used by some users (eg., by 
setting very long timeouts [10]), completely disengaged by others [24], and susceptible 
to several attacks even when users engage it in accordance with the best practices 
[25, 26]. To augment the single line of defence offered by the PIN lock, researchers
9
10
have recently studied the possibility of continuously authenticating users after the 
initial login phase is completed [27].
Among the continuous authentication approaches that have been explored, 
touch-based authentication has attracted a lot of attention given tha t it revolves 
around touch gestures that users execute during their routine operations on the phone 
[10, 11, 12]. Touch gestures arise naturally from operations such as scrolling, zooming 
and clicking, and can thus be used by an authentication application without requiring 
the user to pay attention to the authentication process.
In a recent Active Authentication (AA) research drive championed by the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) [28], touch gestures have been 
identified as one of the candidate biometric modalities that could be built into a pilot 
multi-modal “biometric platform [28]” to be deployed in IT devices at the Department 
of Defense (DoD). W ith the American government actively joining the stake-holders 
interested in evaluating the potential of touch-based authentication, there is now little 
doubt that interest in this area of research is only bound to increase.
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, research on touch-based authentication is 
categorized into two groups: 1) authentication mechanisms in which touch gestures 
are used for authentication at an entry point (e.g., at login), and, 2) authentication 
mechanisms in which touch gestures are extracted continuously as the user performs 
various tasks on the phone. The former category includes studies in which users touch 
behavior is analyzed based on a set of canonically defined gestures [13, 14] or gestures 
strictly captured at the unlock screen [15].
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“Entry point” touch-based authentication has several operational dissimilari­
ties with continuous touch-based authentication. Perhaps the most notable of these is 
the fact th a t the known geometry of the hand can be easily matched with the strictly 
defined structure of a gesture to ensure that only touch points associated with similar 
fingers (say, a thumb in the template and a thumb presented during testing) are 
compared during “entry point” authentication [13]. Such kinds of assumptions can not 
be made with continuous authentication where users freely interact with the phones, 
touching them with whatever fingers and in whatever way they find comfortable. 
Because the attacks designed in this work are targeted against continuous touch- 
based authentication systems, we delve deeper into past works which studied this 
type of authentication.
Using a dataset of 41 users, Prank et al. [10] obtained Equal Error Rates 
(EERs) of between 0 and 4% when a k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) classifier and a 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) were used to continuously authenticate users based 
on their touch gestures. The study was based on 30 features extracted while users 
swiped/scrolled (to move the screen vertically or horizontally) as they read text 
and browsed images. In [12], a digital sensor glove was shown to enhance the 
performance of a touch gesture-based continuous authentication system. Using a 
decision tree, Random Forest and Bayes Net classifier, the authors showed that the 
glove reduced the error rates seen during authentication. For instance, for the Bayes 
Net classifier, a False Accept Rate (FAR) of 11.96% and a False Reject Rate (FRR) 
of 8.53% respectively reduced to 2.14% and 1.63% when the glove was used. Similar 
improvements were noted for the two other classifiers.
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More recently, Li et al. [11] evaluated the performance of a live implementation 
of a touch-based authentication system on a mobile phone. Leveraging a “hack into 
the lower layer of an Android system [11]”, the system monitored touch gestures 
across all applications installed on the phone. Based on a group of 75 users who were 
allowed to freely interact with the phones for days, the SVM-based authentication 
system was shown to attain classification accuracies as high as 95%.
All three papers cited above employ a zero-effort testing routine in which the 
system’s resistance to attack is gauged based on simplistic attacks in which samples 
from a subset of the population are used to attack samples drawn from a given user. 
It is on this front that this work advances the state-of-the-art, studying the impact 
that sophisticated adversaries could have on this type of authentication.
2.2 Related Work and Motivation Behind Keystroke Authentication
Unlike touch-based authentication which traces its roots to just a few years 
ago (following the emergence of touch screen devices), keystroke dynamics dates back 
several decades ago [29, 30]. Right from the earliest works on keystroke dynamics, the 
categorization between fixed-text and continuous keystroke dynamics was apparent: 
Forsen et aVs work in 1977 [29] was based on a small group of users who typed 
each other’s names (i.e., fixed-text) while Gaines et aVs analysis in 1980 [30] was 
based on pages of text typed by the users (i.e., continuous or free text). Over 
the past few decades, both streams of keystroke dynamics have seen a tremendous 
amount of research (see detailed keystroke dynamics history in [31]), with fixed-text 
authentication being evaluated for its potential to add a second layer of defense to the
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password at login-time [2, 32, 5, 6]), and continuous authentication being evaluated 
as a means to repeatedly authenticate a user after the initial login is completed 
[8, 33, 34, 35].
W ith the vast majority of research on this topic assuming a zero-effort threat 
model, there are only a  handful papers which directly relate to the algorithmic attack 
problem addressed in this work. Investigating synthetic attacks against keystroke 
systems, Khandakher et al. [36] present an attack called a Snoop-Forge-Replay attack 
in which an adversary snoops on a victim’s typing session using a keylogger, uses the 
captured data to build a fake template for the user (with the aid of outlier filtering 
in some cases), and then replays the data to defeat the verification mechanism. The 
attack was shown to induce increments in EER (relative to the zero-effort baseline) 
of between 69.33 % and 2730.55 % depending on parameters such as the amount of 
text snooped, the outlier filtering policy and the classifier used for authentication.
The attacks in [37] and [7] build on the same idea used in [36] as they both use 
a keylogger to steal a user’s typing latencies before using the stolen data as a source 
of input for an attack against the same user. The attack in [37] uses the captured 
latencies to train human impostors who later attack the victim’s keystroke profile, 
while the attack in [7] uses these latencies as a basis for systematically morphing 
the victim’s template into a weaker template that can easily succumb to attack. The 
major difference between these works and our research is that our generative algorithm 
uses general information on how a typical user would type a given string, and does not 
depend on text snooped from the victim. It is thus not surprising that the attacks in 
[36], [37] and [7] attain much higher success rates than our attack (i.e., relative to the
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zero-effort attack, the increments in EER were as high as 2730.55%, 395% and 305% 
in [36], [37] and [7] respectively compared to a maximum increment of 84.4% in our 
work). That said, our belief is that the relative ease of accessing general population 
keystroke statistics as compared to the intricacies of snooping on the typing session 
of an intended victim should make our model of attack more appealing to attackers 
in practice.
In [16], it was shown that an authentication system (called TUBA [16]) using 
a Support Vector Machine (SVM) for keystroke verification was able to repel a form 
of statistical attack. Unfortunately, the authors did not publish the parameters used 
to set up the SVM verifier, as they stated that “our timing approach was more along 
the lines of brute-force, and we thus do not show the final chosen parameters [16]” . 
We do not run our attack against the verifier used in [16], since it is very difficult to 
make a meaningful comparison without a set of common parameter settings. However, 
we evaluate our attack against three state-of-the-art keystroke verification algorithms 
(details in Section 5.4) that have been demonstrated to be among the best for fixed 
text authentication, do not require sophisticated tuning of parameters, and whose 
implementation details we have clearly laid out for other researchers who may seek 
to evaluate their statistical attacks against the same set of verifiers.
Below, we discuss four major aspects that put our algorithmic attack apart 
from that implemented in [16]:
1. Feature Distribution Assumptions—The attack in [16] is built under the assump­
tion that keystroke features follow a Gaussian distribution. However, as we show 
in this work (Section 4), this assumption is suspect since we find none of the
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115 features extracted from our samples to be Gaussian. W ith Stefan et al. [16] 
not having tested their samples for Gaussianity, it is difficult to tell whether 
their conclusion about keystroke dynamics being resilient to synthetic forgeries 
could have been impacted by the Gaussianity assumption. Our attack does not 
make any assumptions about the keystroke feature distributions.
2. Size of User-population and Duration of Data Collection—Stefan et al. [16] esti­
mated the parameters of their assumed Gaussian distribution, and implemented 
their attack based on data collected from a small group of 20 users. Even if 
the keystroke features had indeed been Gaussian, parameter estimates from a 
dataset of 20 users are unlikely to accurately represent the underlying distri­
bution. Also, as we show in Section 5.5, the dip in mean system performance 
seen under our statistical attacks primarily originated from a small proportion 
of about 10% to 20 % of the full population who badly succumbed to the attack. 
With a small set of 20 users, the likelihood of capturing the full variety of typing 
traits naturally diminishes, and it is thus not so surprising that the work in [16] 
appears to have failed to reflect the impact of the “poor” users who negatively 
impacted the overall system performance in our experiments. The fact that 
the dataset in [16] was collected over a short period of time also made it hard 
to get a realistic view of the attack performance, since the inconsistency and 
long-term evolution of users’ features that a  statistical attack would typically 
be expected to exploit was obviously not reflected in the users’ keystroke data 
samples.
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3. Attack Design—The attack in [16] did not use any additional keystroke-feature 
properties (besides the assumed Gaussian behavior of keystroke features) to 
aid the feature space enumeration process. Our attack exploits the feature 
distributions, discriminability and dependencies between keystroke features to 
traverse the search space as intelligently as possible. We believe that the usage 
of a wider range of keystroke feature properties during attack design should 
make our statistical attack more rigorous than that implemented by Stefan et 
al. [16].
4. Keystroke Features Used— The attack in [16] was based on a relatively new 
feature-set1, which despite extending our understanding of the different features 
that a keystroke system could use, left behind the question: How would the 
traditional keystroke features (described in Section 4) on which most proposed 
keystroke systems have been based, perform against synthetic forgeries ? Our 
work addresses this question by subjecting these (traditional) features to the 
attacks.
The works in [38, 39], despite being based on handwriting biometrics evaluate 
the performance of a wide range of synthetic attacks in an environment similar to 
ours. In particular, the generative attack whose input is either extracted from general 
population handwriting statistics or from text written by the victim in a context 
different from that of the exact word (or phrase) subject to attack, closely relates
to our work by virtue of using an automated algorithmic approach against short
1Prom a 14-character string, they extract a 121 dimensional feature vector which they later reduce 
through Principal Component Analysis
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strings of text comparable to the password-like strings used in this paper. For certain 
categories of users, this attack was shown to considerably outperform attacks launched 
by trained human forgers in a verification mechanism which included both human 
judges and an automated reference monitor.
These findings motivate the work in this paper, although it is noteworthy that 
the operational dissimilarities between keystroke dynamics and handwriting mean 
tha t our algorithmic framework can not directly derive from the approach in [38]. 
Another difference between ours and Ballard et aVs [38] work, is that we do not 
extract any input from strings typed by the intended victim, since we focus on an 
attacker who only uses global typing traits to launch local attacks against individuals.
W ith regard to the keystroke statistical traits that we investigate to guide the 
design of our attack algorithm, Janakiraman et al. [40] also studied the discriminabil- 
ity of keystroke feature vectors as we do in this paper. However, that work was not 
based on fixed text (see detailed description of fixed text in Section 3.2) and used a 
small dataset built from samples collected from a group of 22 users. Meanwhile for 
the discriminability analysis performed by Balagani et al. [5], the authors used fixed 
text like in this paper, but again used a small population of 33 users and compared 
discriminability between heterogeneous and aggregate keystroke feature vectors, as 
opposed to a feature by feature evaluation which we use in this work. W ith all that 
said, the performance analysis methodology used in [5, 40] differs from the approach 
taken in this paper, since none of the two works subjected the observed differences 
difference in discriminative power seen across features to  formal statistical tests of 
significance. The absence of formal statistical analysis particularly makes it hard to
18
generalize the findings (such as the means and standard deviations reported in [40]) 




We collected several thousand typing samples in four 3-week events, spread 
over a 2-year period between 2009 and 2011. All typists were staff, students and 
faculty of Louisiana Tech University. Table 3.1 summarizes the details of the dataset 
used in our experiments.
Table 3.1: Summary of dataset details
D a te G ender F irs t  L anguage H an dedness
Male Female English Other Left Right Ambidextrous
Oct 2009 589 412 - - - - -
Apr 2010 690 488 967 205 100 1051 22
Oct 2010 692 507 974 216 112 1052 21
Oct 2011 715 521 1007 221 117 1046 24
The missing values are because some details were not captured during the first 
phase of experiments when the project had just been initiated. Observe that the total 
number of users may appear inconsistent in some of the phases. For example, the sum 
of male and female typists in the April-2010 dataset is 1178, yet the sum of English 
and non English speakers for the same phase of experiments is 1172. The reason for 
the discrepancy is tha t some users opted not to fill certain fields of the questionnaire
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handed out before the typing exercise. The sum of female and male typists however 
reflects the actual total typing population for each phase.
3.2 Typing Samples
While a wide range of samples were collected during the study, this work 
focuses on samples which were collected as fixed text. W ith fixed text, a user types 
a memorized word or very short sentence that constitutes little or no cognitive load. 
Such text closely mimics basic authentication in which a password or short passphrase 
may be typed by a user at log-in time. The ideal way to collect such text is by having 
users type their actual passwords, for which they must have developed a natural 
typing pattern over time. Unfortunately this option has major security implications 
and is generally not used in keystroke research. Past works simulated fixed text entry 
in two ways- some studies used a common password string (typically having about 
8-10 characters) across all users [6, 2], while others used a short sentence that could 
be easily memorized by users [5]. The usage of a sentence in the latter category 
of works was mainly motivated by the need to investigate how some modalities of 
fixed text keystroke authentication {e.g., classification accuracies) depend on variables 
such as the identities of characters making up users’ passwords (or passphrases), or 
authentication-string lengths such as in [5]. In such cases, the limited number of 
characters in a short password string would limit the scope of analysis.
Because our work involved investigations on a wide range of variables, we also 
used a sentence to simulate fixed text entry, and had users type the phrase “/  am 
an Undergraduate Student of Louisiana Tech U niversity. Our belief is that subsets
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of this phrase should give a plausible approximation of the nature of real passwords. 
Also, with most of the users in our study being undergraduate students of Louisiana 
Tech University, we figured that the words in this phrase would be familiar and easy 
to memorize.
To simulate password entry in our experiments, it was crucial that the char­
acter distribution in our fixed text reflected the character distribution seen in real 
passwords. Table 3.2 compares the frequencies of the different characters in our typing 
sample with those in three recently hacked password lists (details of the three lists 
— i.e., the Singles.org, Myspace.com and phpBB.com password lists can be found in 
[20, 42]). The tabulated summary of the password character percentages is compiled 
from the statistics published in [42].
Table 3.2: Frequencies of the most common characters in passwords found on 3 
recently hacked password lists compared with frequencies of the same characters in 
the phrase studied in this work.
C h a ra c te r P assw ord  L ist P h ra se  U sed  in  
th is  W orkSingles.org Myspace.com phpBB.com
e 8.84% 7.71% 8.95% 10.0%
a 8.13% 7.00% 8.79% 12.0%
0 6.01% 5.46% 6.32% 4.00%
s 5.60% 4.89% 5.93% 6.00%
i 5.42% 4.84% 5.24% 8.00%
n 5.18% 4.28% 5.32% 10.00%
r 5.08% 4.69% 6.13% 6.00%
t 3.78% 3.55% 4.78% 10.00%
u 2.54% 2.29% 3.26% 10.00%
TO TA L 50.58% 44.71% 49.4% 76%
For the password lists, the 3 tabulated values in each row represent the number 
of times a character appears on the list as a percentage of the total number of 
characters on the list. The value tabulated for our phrase is the number of times
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a character appears in the phrase as a percentage of the total number of characters 
in the phrase. Our percentages do not exactly match those in the lists, although it 
is clear that we captured many of the most frequently occurring characters on the 
password lists. Note that the very low frequency of special characters in the hacked 
password lists (full statistics can be found in [42]) supports the omission of these 
characters from our study.
During the typing sessions, users easily memorized the phrase, and quickly 
got into their regular typing rhythm after just a few trials. Whenever the system 
detected an error after the user had typed the full string, the parser prompted the 
user to re-enter the string afresh, like is done in regular password entry1. All typing 
was done using DELL QWERTY keyboards. Across the several typing phases, users 
provided 12 to 20 samples of this string during each typing session.
3.3 Keystroke Features and Pre-processing M ethod
3.3.1 Keystroke Features
For every key typed by a user, there are two associated time stamps—the time 
when the key is pressed, and the time when the key is released. Figure 3.1 illustrates 
these time stamps for the digraph H I, with Ph representing the time when the letter 
H  is pressed, R h representing the time when letter H  is released, and the time stamps 
for the letter I  defined similarly. For the digraph H I, three independent features can
be derived from the raw time stamps. These are the Key Hold Time, K H T h of letter
1The program used during the last phase of experiments did not have this parsing module. For 
data collected during that phase, we scanned the data after it was collected and eliminated a given 
typing instance of the passphrase if it had at least one error.
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H, the Key Interval Time, K IT h i between H  and I, and the Key Hold Time, K H T i 
of letter I. These features can respectively be calculated as: KHT'h =  R h — Ph , 
K IT hi = Pi — R h and K H T i = R i — Pi, with K IT h i assuming a negative value if 
I  is pressed before H  is released.
i k k k
KHTh KITh, KHT,
V 1 r
- - - - - - - - - - - - - ►
H R H R. T im e
F ig u re  3.1: An illustration of the “atomic” features used in keystroke dynamics.
From these three “atomic” features, a number of other features can be derived 
to represent a user’s typing pattern for the digraph H I. Examples of these features 
include the up — up time {— R i — R h or K H T i +  K IT h i), the down — down time 
(= Pi — PH or K H T h + K IT Hi ), and the total time required to type the full digraph 
(=  R i — Ph or K H T h + K IT hi +  K H Ti). For longer words, additional features 
can be derived from the “atomic” features to express the time interval between any 
sequence of adjacent characters within the word. For instance in a word made of 5 
characters, n-graphs can be defined {e.g., trigraphs, 4-graphs, 5-graphs [40, 43]) in 
addition to the set of features already described above. Because the bulk of keystroke 
features are just linear combinations of the “atomic” features (i.e., the K H T s  and 
K IT s) ,  most keystroke verification systems are designed to use these two features 
(for summary statistics of which studies have used which features refer to [5, 6]). In 
order to make a thorough analysis while avoiding duplications, this dissertation thus
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also focuses on the K H T s  and K IT s .  We believe that their properties will provide 
insights into the properties of the other kinds of features.
3.3.2 Outlier Filtering
Over the several samples collected from each user, uncharacteristically long 
pauses could occur at various points in the string and pollute the user’s template if 
not filtered out. For each feature, we use the distance-based outlier detection method 
in [44] to filter out outliers from each user’s samples before using the data for our 
statistical analysis. In this method, a point is considered an inlier if 68% of all the 
points are within 100 ms of it. These thresholds were fixed heuristically in [44], and 
have been found to perform well in a number of other works (see an example in [9]).
CHAPTER 4
KEYSTROKE FEATURE PROPERTIES
In this section we present the keystroke feature traits seen across our dataset. 
We discuss their implications to keystroke dynamics research and to the design of 
statistical attacks in particular. For all statistical tests performed, we report results 
based on a critical value of a  =  5%.
4.1 D is tr ib u tio n  o f K ey  H old  an d  In te r-k ey  T im es
O b se rv a tio n #  1: All KHTs and KITs extracted from our fixed-phrase, “I  am 
an undergraduate student of Louisiana Tech University”, did not obey a Gaussian 
distribution
E vidence to  S u p p o rt O bserva tion  # 1 :  We used the Lilliefors [45] and 
Cramer-von Mises [46] tests to formally check whether keystroke feature data follows 
the normal distribution. A modification of the Kolmogorov Smirnov (K-S) test [47], 
the Lilliefors test returns a more accurate P-value (than the K-S test) when the 
parameters of the hypothesized distribution are not completely specified during the 
test [45]. We included the Cramer-von Mises test in our hypothesis testing routine 
for the purpose of checking the result returned by the Lilliefors test, since different 
categories of normality tests may sometimes fail to agree on the distribution followed
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by a  given dataset. For both normality tests and other statistical tests performed in 
this work, we used the R  [48] statistical programming environment.
We ran the two normality tests for all features extracted from the fixed-phrase 
(57 KITs and 58 KHTs). For instance, to test whether the KITs of digraph GR 
followed a Gaussian distribution, we created a vector Vqr containing every user’s 
latencies for digraph GR, from which we derived another vector VGR, containing 5000 
latencies that were randomly selected from Vqr■ The normality tests were performed 
on the vector V'GR. For every feature extracted from the fixed-phrase, we repeated 
the process as done for digraph GR.
Our method of performing the hypothesis testing on random sub-samples 
(rather than the full population), has also been used in past work [49, 50], and is 
motivated by the fact that large datasets tend to have statistically inexact descrip­
tions, which in turn  makes it hard for a goodness-of-fit test to produce meaningful 
results if directly applied to the whole dataset [49]. For each normality test performed, 
our null hypothesis was that the latencies in the test vector came from the normal 
distribution. The alternative hypothesis was that the elements of the vector did not 
follow the normal distribution. For each vector tested, we rejected the null hypothesis 
for both the Lilliefors and Cramer-von Mises tests.
Note that while we perform a very large number of tests, we do not make any 
corrections (such as Bonferroni) on the critical values (of the Gaussianity tests and 
all other tests performed in the study) because each test checks a different hypothesis. 
For instance since we aim to study the distribution followed by each individual feature 
in our test-phrase, the test whether digraph GR followed a Gaussian distribution is
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distinct from the test whether digraph LO  followed a Gaussian distribution. For this 
reason our result-reporting throughout the dissertation is centered around identifying 
and counting the number of features of a certain type for which a certain hypothesis 
holds or fails to hold.
Figure 4.1 shows the quantile-quantile(Q-Q) plots [51] for two features which 
illustrate the general trend seen across the dataset (See [52] for more visualizations 
of feature distributions.). A Q-Q plot compares the quantiles of one sample against 
the quantiles of another. If the samples come from the same distribution, the plot 
will be linear even if one distribution is shifted or re-scaled from the other. In our 
plots, keystroke feature data is compared with samples drawn from the Gaussian 
distribution. For instance the Q-Q plot in Figure 4. la  compares the KITs of digraph 

























Standard Normal Quantiles Standard Normal Quantiles
(a) Q-Q plot for KITs of digraph SI (b) Q-Q plot for the KHTs of letter T
F ig u re  4.1: Q-Q plots demonstrating the goodness-of-fit of the normal distribution 
for selected keystroke features.
The figure shows that the KITs of digraph S I  (Figure 4.1a) depicted a signifi­
cant positive skew as evidenced from the sharp departure from the straight (normal)
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line. On the other hand, the KHTs of letter T  (Figure 4.1b) demonstrated a less 
pronounced departure from the normal distribution, although both features ultimately 
failed the normality test. We observed the tra it depicted in Figures 4.1a and 4.1b 
across many features and concluded that some features were more Gaussian-like than 
others despite all features returning very low P values.
Im p a c t o f O bservation  # 1  on  K eystroke R esearch : The fact that all 
the features in our fixed-phrase fail the Gaussian test suggests that past studies such 
as [53, 16] which have built entirely on the Gaussian assumption across all features, 
could see improved results if features derived from the typing samples used in those 
works had been closely studied to determine which ones are more accurately modeled 
by the Gaussian distribution.
For the designer of a statistical attack, this non-Gaussian behavior explains 
why a simple generative model that uses the means and standard deviations as 
the central reference parameters during forgery generation may not always work 
well. In the attacks launched in this work, these findings prompt us to focus on 
a non-parametric attack-design, in which we explicitly work with individual feature 
histograms, without globally assuming Gaussian behavior of the keystroke features.
4.2 K eystroke F ea tu re  D iscrim inab ility
In this section we investigate the discriminative power of the different keystroke 
features extracted from our typing samples.
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O b s e rv a tio n # 2: In comparisons made between each K IT  and each K H T  
extracted from our fixed phrase, we rejected the null hypothesis that a KH T was as 
discriminative as a K IT  in favor of the alternative hypothesis that a K IT  was more 
discriminative than a KH T in 98% of the comparisons. Also, we found that certain 
KITs had considerably higher discriminative power than the rest of the KITs, just like 
certain KHTs had considerably higher discriminative power than the rest o f the KHTs 
E vidence to  S u p p o rt O b se rv a tio n # 2 : To study feature discriminability, 
we use the Bhattacharyya distance metric [40] to estimate the extent of overlap 
between the pdfs of users’ features. Equation 4.1 shows the definition of the B- 
hattacharyya distance, DB for the pdfs ufix) and ufix). A Bhattacharyya distance 
of 1 means that two pdfs overlap completely while a distance of 0 means the pdfs 
do not overlap at all. The more the overlap, the poorer the discriminability of the 
feature in question for the pair of users under study.
The first step in the D B computation is to empirically estimate the pdfs, ufix) 
and U j ( x ) ,  representing the latencies of users i and j  for a given feature. To this end 
we use the binning approach advocated by [40], in which the clock resolution used 
to time-stamp keystroke events is set as the bin size. With both ufix) and ufix)  
partitioned into bins, we multiply probabilities associated with corresponding bins, 
take the square root of each product, and then sum the results over all bins to obtain 




For each of the 115 features in our dataset, we compute D b as explained 
above, using a set of 3000 randomly selected user-pairs. Each user-pair (represented 
by the pdfs Uj ( x)  and Uj ( x ) )  results into a single value of D b , which means that our 
computation produces a vector containing 3000 D B values for each feature. Let Dfl 
denote the vector of Bhattacharyya distances associated with the feature /?, and D j2 
denote a similar vector for the feature f 2. Each of these vectors contains 3000 D B 
values for the 3000 user-pairs. The vectors are such that the user-pair corresponding 
to the D b value in the ith position in vector D fx is the same user-pair corresponding 
to the i th entry in vector Df2. The ith element in the vector A D f — D fx — Dj2 is thus 
the difference between the discriminabilities (Bhattacharyya distances) of features f t 
and fg for the ith pair of users.
To determine whether the vector A D f pointed to a significantly large difference 
in discriminability between the features f i , and fg, we used the Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test [54]. We zeroed on this test after finding that the differences-vectors across the 
population were far from Gaussian (based on observation of Q-Q plots and P  values 
returned by Lilliefors normality test). The test generally “measures the tendency of 
one sample to contain values that are larger than those in another sample [55]” , and 
is known to be robust when the testing distributions are non-normal [6]. Even where 
the parent populations are Gaussian, this test does not perform much worse than the 
t-test [56, 57].
A critical requirement of this test is that the vector A D f should be sym­
metrically distributed around some median. Real-world data being rarely perfectly 
symmetric however, the test is often applied when data is approximately symmetric
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[58], since the less restrictive alternative non-parametric test (i.e., the Sign test [59]), 
is generally considered less powerful1 than the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. In this work 
we used the rules of thumb in [60] (in addition to visual inspection of histograms in 
some cases) to check for the symmetry of our A D j vectors. According to these rules, 
a distribution is considered approximately symmetric if its skewness is between -0.5 
and 0.5, moderately skewed if its skewness is between -1 and -0.5 or between 1 and 
0.5, and highly skewed if the skewness is less than -1 or greater than 1.
When f i  and f 2 were both KHTs, all A D f vectors that we computed were 
approximately symmetric. Meanwhile in cases where both f i  and f 2 were KITs, the 
vast majority (?» 95%) of A D f vectors were approximately symmetric, with a few («  
5%) being moderately skewed. Cases where / i  was a KHT and f 2 was a KIT exhibited 
behavior that was in between the previous two cases. These results prompted us to 
conclude that the Wilcoxon signed-rank test was appropriate for our data. (See 
Appendix A for some symmetry results highlights).
The discriminability investigations conducted in this work were divided into 
two parts: In the first part, we sought to establish the extent to which the dis­
criminative power of KITs generally compared to that of KHTs. As such, we made 
our computations in such a way that for each pair of features compared, ft  was a 
KHT while f 2 was a KIT. The null hypothesis for the Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
performed on each of these pairs was that the vector A D f — D fx — D f2 followed a
continuous symmetric distribution with zero median, which implied that the difference
1The lower power of this test relative to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is mostly attributed to 
the fact that it uses limited information about the data, as it only takes into consideration the 
arithmetic signs of the elements in A D f ,  and not their magnitudes [59].
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A D f  between the Bhattacharyya distance-vectors of features fi  and fs  over the 
population was insignificant. The alternative hypothesis was that A D f, came from 
a continuous symmetric distribution with median greater than zero, which implied 
that the KHT represented by fi  had higher Bhattacharyya distances (and hence lower 
discriminability) than the KIT represented by /2 over the population .
Since our typing sample contained 57 KITs and 58 KHTs, we made a total 
of 3306 (= 57 x 58) hypothesis tests since each KIT was tested against each KHT. 
We rejected the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis in about 98% 
(3239 of 3306) of the tests, an indication that for the vast majority of tests, we could 
not find evidence to suggest that a KHT was as discriminative as a KIT. Figure 4.2 
provides a visual perspective of how the discriminability of KHTs in our test-phrase 
compared to that of the KITs.
 KHTs
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F ig u re  4.2: Comparing mean Battacharyya distances associated with KITs with 
those associated with KHTs in our typing samples
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The figure compares the mean Bhattacharyya distances of the KITs side-by- 
side with those of the KHTs extracted from our typing samples over the population. 
Following the notation used throughout this section, the mean Bhattacharyya dis­
tance of a feature f x is computed by dividing the sum of the elements in vector 
by 3000. This value will give some measure of how a feature such as f x discriminated 
between each pair of users over the 3000 user-pairs. For each of the 58 KHTs in our 
typing samples, we compute this mean value, and plot a CDF of the full array of 
mean values on Figure 4.2. We do the same for the 57 KITs in our sample.
As shown in Figure 4.2, KITs were more discriminative on average, as over 80% 
of them were associated with a mean Bhattacharyya distance of less than 0.6, while 
about the same percentage were associated with a mean Bhattacharyya distance of 
more than 0.6 for the case of the KHTs. These results support our findings from the 
hypothesis tests, as they provide confirmation that the KITs were more discriminative 
than the KHTs.
In our further investigations, we sought to establish how discriminability varied 
across KITs and across KHTs. This way, we should be able to determine if any KITs 
were considerably more (or less) discriminative than the rest of the KITs, and if any 
KHTs were considerably more (or less) discriminative than the rest of the KHTs. We 
thus performed a set of hypothesis tests in which both f x and /g were KITs or KHTs.
Due to space limitations we only present results from these tests for a few 
pairs of KHTs and KITs that are enough to support our conclusions on the disparity 
in the discriminability of different keystroke features. Based on P values that were
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approximately equal to  zero, we rejected the hypotheses th a t2: 1) digraph U I was as 
discriminative as digraph —O, 2) digraph I S  was as discriminative as digraph —O, 3) 
digraph D E  was as discriminative as digraph OF, 4) letter S  was as discriminative 
as letter M, and 5) letter N  was as discriminative as letter I. Across the full dataset, 
we observed a number of features which were significantly much more discriminative 
than the others.
Im p a c t o f O bservation  # 2  on  K eystroke R esearch : Over the several 
decades of research on keystroke dynamics, very few papers (such as in [61, 16]) 
have applied feature selection during the keystroke template building process. W ith 
results in this section revealing certain features in our test-phrase to  be significantly 
more discriminative than others, our work should motivate research on how feature 
selection could be employed to build users’ profiles based on the most discriminative 
features. We believe that this direction of research could potentially improve the 
performance of keystroke verification systems.
Specific to the statistical attacks launched in this work, these findings on 
feature discriminability will be crucial for our feature-space enumeration strategy. 
Details of this strategy are discussed in Section 5.2 during our description of the 
attack.
2 The hyphen represents the space character
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4.3 In te r-F e a tu re  D ependencies
In this section we study the dependencies between the keystroke features. 
O bserva tion  # 3 :  For a large number of feature-pairs in our fixed phrase, we 
found evidence to indicate that one feature depended on the other.
E vidence to  S u p p o rt O bservation  # 3 :  To study the dependencies exhib­
ited by our keystroke data, we computed the mutual information between keystroke 
features. In contrast to measures such as the Pearson correlation which are sensitive 
to linear dependencies, mutual information measures correlation in general terms, 
and is sensitive to both linear and non-linear associations between variables. For two 
random variables X  and Y , the mutual information I (X ;Y )  is defined as:
( 4 2 )
where Px  and Py are respectively the probability mass functions (pmf) of X  and 
Y , and Px y  is the pm f of the joint distribution between the two random variables. 
I ( X \Y )  expresses the reduction in uncertainity of variable X  given variable Y . In 
our experiments, the random variables X  and Y  correspond to two different keystroke 
features. Details of how we pre-process the keystroke feature data for I ( X \Y )  com­
putation follow:
Let f i j  denote the value of the j th feature during the ith typing attem pt of a us­
er, where 1 < i < n, 1 < j  < m. The vector V  = £ • ( £  f a  £  f a  £  f a '  * * £  Am)
i = l  i = l  i = 1 i = l
is the feature-means vector for each user. For many keystroke verification algorithms, 
this vector is the main building block of a user’s profile (e.g., see [6] for a survey),
36
and is the basis against which feature vectors extracted from later typing attempts 
are judged to match (or not match) the user’s typing pattern. We use this vector to 
represent each user’s typing pattern during our mutual information computations.
For each user we first compute the vector V, and then create a 2  dimensional 
matrix, M, whose every row is the vector V, computed for a different user. For a 
group of k users, M  is a k x m  matrix, for which the j th column (1 < j  < m) is a 
vector, Uj, in which each element is the mean value of feature j  for one of the k users. 
Our computation of I ( X ; T) between keystroke features will be based on pairs of the 
vectors Uj, since each of these vectors represents a single feature over the population.
For a pair of features identified by the indices j  = 1 and j  =  2, we first bin 
the associated vectors U\ and U2 (corresponding to X  and Y  in Equation 4.2) using 
the approach described in Section 4.2, before applying Equation 4.2 to calculate 
the mutual information between the two feature vectors. To determine whether 
the amount of mutual information between U\ and U2 is statistically significant, we 
perform the mutual information permutation test [62, 63], with the null hypothesis 
being that the expected mutual information between the two vectors is zero (i.e., that 
the two vectors are independent). The alternative hypothesis is that the two vectors 
are dependent on each other. Since our test phrase has 115 features (=57KITs and 
58KHTs) there are ( ^ ^  =  6555 possible feature pairings. We run this test for each 
of the 6555 feature-pairs.
Before presenting the results, we define what we term as similar features. We 
refer to multiple instances of a given digraph, (or onegraph) in a word as a set of 
similar features. For example, since the word STUDENT  has two instances of the
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letter T, we refer to a feature-pair comprised of the KHTs of the two Ts as having 
similar features. We report results from the mutual information tests on such feature- 
pairs separately from those of the rest of the feature-pairs comprised of dissimilar 
features because high amounts of mutual information between similar features could 
give a deceptive view of how keystroke features depended on each other in general.
For tests run on feature-pairs comprising of similar features, we rejected the 
null hypothesis (i.e., the hypothesis that vectors in a pair were independent) in 
85% of the tests, an indication that the way in which users typed a key gave a 
significant amount of information about how they typed the same key at different 
locations within the typing sample. Meanwhile for the tests run on feature-pairs 
containing dissimilar features, we rejected the null hypothesis (of independence) 
in over 40% of the cases, an indication that even some of the dissimilar features 
exhibited dependencies. Table 4.1 captures the inter-feature dependencies in terms 
of conditional probabilities of the form P ( f\  < a  \ f i  < fi).
Table 4.1: Conditional probabilities between KITs of selected digraphs.
Event Probability
P (K IT AD < 100 | K IT h_ < 100) 0.50
P (K IT ad < 100 | K IT at < 100) 0.51
P {K IT ad < 100 | K IT du <  100) 0.51
P (K IT UN < 150 | K IT ra <  150) 0.59
P (K IT -u  <  150 | K IT ra <  150) 0.30
P (K IT CH <  150 | K IT ra < 150) 0.98
The features ( /i  and / 2), and thresholds (a and /3) used in the table axe chosen 
arbitrarily to give an example of how the extent of dependency between certain 
features could (or could not) aid statistical inferences about the features. The
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represents the space character. Take the case of digraph R A  for instance. A user 
who typed the digraph R A  in under 150ms was very likely to type digraphs C H  in 
under 150ms, very unlikely to type digraph —U in under 150ms, and moderately likely 
to type digraphs U N  in under 150ms. This means that an adversary who knew how 
users were likely to type the digraph R A  in our typing sample could (potentially) have 
lowered the search space for the digraphs CH , U— and U N  during an attack against 
a randomly selected user. Not all inter-feature probabilities (for different thresholds 
a,/3) were that interesting however. For instance, a user who typed digraphs DU, 
A T  or H- in under 100 ms had almost equal likelihood of typing digraph AD  in over 
100ms as in under 100 ms. In this case an adversary seeking to determine if a random 
user typed digraph AD  in under 100 ms could not benefit much from the knowledge 
that the victim (or a typical user) typed the digraphs DU, A T  or H- in under 100 ms.
Im p a c t o f O bservation  # 3  on  K eystroke  R esearch : While biometric 
features are typically associated with dependencies and correlations [64], no previous 
work has investigated the extent of these dependencies in keystroke dynamics to the 
best of our knowledge. Our findings thus represent the first empirical evaluation of 
the dependencies exhibited by keystroke features, and should influence:— 1 ) Analytic 
work such as [5] in which assumptions regarding keystroke feature dependencies are 
used to aid investigations into various aspects of keystroke dynamics; and 2) The 
design of statistical attacks that build off of the inter-feature dependencies to break 
keystroke systems. The latter direction of research should in turn  motivate work on 
defences against these types of attacks before they take root in real systems. Our
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attacks in this work actually also exploit the feature dependencies, as we use the 
conditional probabilities between features to make decisions on how to traverse the 
search space.
CHAPTER 5
THE KEYSTROKE STATISTICAL ATTACKS
In this section we discuss the underlying assumptions, implementation details 
and performance of the statistical attack on the fixed-text keystroke authentication 
system.
5.1 A ssum ptions an d  A ttack  Scenarios
A ssu m p tio n  # 1 : We assume that the adversary knows the victim’s password 
and has access to keystroke forging software. We discussed these two issues and 
provided accompanying evidence during our discussion in Chapter 1. We thus do not 
re-emphasize them here. Perhaps the only point we have to add is that although 
different keystroke verifiers may be based on different features, the attacker does not 
have to know about these features, since the verification system will automatically 
parse the bot-injected samples for the right features in the same way it would for a 
human typist.
A ssu m p tio n  # 2 : We assume that the attacker will be able to access large 
amounts of keystroke data so as to extract the keystroke feature statistics needed to 
design the attack. One obvious option available to the adversary is to use accomplices 
to provide biometrics samples for the password in question. Ballard et al. [65] also 
cite this data collection option in their paper on synthetic attacks against handwritten
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signatures. Other possibilities include crowdsourcing with the aid of fake keylogging 
Web sites, directly extracting feature statistics from publicly accessible keystroke 
datasets, or even fooling unsuspecting users at a public Cyber Cafe so as to have 
them type a common pass code (matching the victim’s authentication data) for access 
while a key logger captures keystroke sequences.
A tta c k  Scenarios: Our main attack scenario is the case of an adversary who 
uses a personal machine to attack other users via the Internet. If for instance Bob 
wants to launch an attack against a keystroke-protected Facebook account owned by 
Alice, Bob only has to make authentication attempts at the Facebook server using 
attack-software installed on his own machine. The attack is thus not affected by any 
host-based defences (such as the one in [6 6 ]) deployed at Alice’s machine since the 
injection of synthetic keys is done at the attacker’s own machine.
In high security applications such as online banking, the server may, in addition 
to Alice’s password and keystroke signature also authenticate the IP address used by 
Alice to make her transactions. This means that Bob, seated at his own compromised 
computer may not be able to make successful authentication attempts against Alice’s 
account. Our attack may hence only work in that case if Bob can have physical access 
to Alice’s machine so as to compromise any defences and (or) install and launch the 
keystroke forging software. This attack scenario will be much less likely than the first, 
but cant be ruled out given a committed adversary.
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5.2 The Attack Algorithm
Algorithm 1 shows how our attack extracts features from a user’s password,
and how it uses population data to generate feature values to be used for attack.
For each distinct KHT and KIT in the victim’s password, the algorithm bins the
associated latencies over the population using a bin size defined by the value of the
binSize parameter, and then returns the centers of the h highest frequency bins.
A L G O R I T H M  1 :  Generating feature outputs to be used for tree traversal 
I n p u t :  User’s password string / / E . g . ,  ABAB;
I n p u t :  KD population data corresponding to password string
O u t p u t :  Matrix of feature outputs for each feature
KHTs [ ]«— Distinct characters in password / / E . g . ,  KHTs=[A B] for  s tr in g  ABAB; 
KITs [ ]<— Distinct digraphs in password / / E . g . ,  KITs=[AB BA] fo r  s tr in g  ABAB; 
Features [ ]f-[KHTs KITs] / /  E . g . ,  Features=[A B AB BA];
NumberOfFeatures-<—NumberOf(Features)// Number0fFeatures=4 fo r  s tr in g  ABAB; 
for *<— 1 to  Num ber O f F eatures// Assume low est array index i s  1 fo r  s im p lic ity ;  
do
BinnedFeature[i]<—Binning(Features[i], binSize);
//U se  a bin s iz e  of b inS ize to  bin the la te n c ie s  of F e a tu r e s [ i] . Return 
bins sorted in  descending order of probability;
for j<- 1 t o  h d o
F[i,j]«—SelectDominantBins(BinnedFeature[i], h);
//Each pass through inner loop assign s center of j th bin  of 
F eature[i] to  the array lo c a tio n  F [ i , j ] ;
/ / E . g . ,  For KHT of A (see  Figure 5 . 1 ) ,  we sh a ll have F [l, 1] =  A  : V\ , 
F[1,2] = A :V 2, F[l,3] =  A:Vrs;
Return F //M atrix  containing a to ta l  of h outputs fo r  each feature;
Take the password string A B A B  for instance. The KHTs of A and B  and 
the KITs of A B  and BA  are respectively the distinct KHTs and KITs extracted 
from this password string. Across the population, the algorithm extracts and bins 
the latencies corresponding to each of these four features, and then determines the 
centers of the h highest frequency bins in each of the four cases. We heuristically
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set the binSize parameter as 16 m s  since this value gave us good results during 
our experiments. The function BinningQ  performs the binning process, while the 
function SelectDominantBinsQ  returns the centers of the most frequent bins. We 
set the value of h as 3 in this work, implying that Algorithm 1  (or the function 
SelectDominantBinsQ  in particular) returns three bin centers for each of the four 
features.
For a feature such as the KHT of A, we use the notation A  : Vi, A : V2 and 
A . \ 3  to refer to the 3 bin centers returned by Algorithm 1. The first (i.e., A  : Vi) 
corresponds to the highest frequency bin while the last (i.e., A  : V3 ) corresponds to 
the lowest frequency bin. During the search process, these three values per feature 
will account for only a small portion of the search space, but should be sufficient to 
illustrate the power of the attack.
Note that since the binning is explicitly built off of empirical data, rather than 
off of parametric density functions (say, under the Gaussian assumption), the highest 
probability bin will not necessarily be centered at the population mean. Additionally, 
for features having skewed or multi-modal distributions, a sequence of high probability 
bins may be located at the same side of the population mean, which would also not 
be the case under the Gaussian assumption.
We formulate the feature-space enumeration process as a  tree traversal in 
which each tree level represents a feature. Figure 5.1 illustrates the structure of this 
tree for the hypothetical password A B A B . The figure is motivated by the attack tree 
used for the analysis of Biometrics Cryptographic Key Generators (BKGs) in [64],
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KHTs
F ig u re  5.1: Enumerating the keystroke feature space for the hypothetical password 
A B A B .
although we use a  completely different algorithmic framework tuned to exploit our 
observed statistical traits.
The enumeration process begins by setting the output value of the feature 
located at the root of the tree. Before delving into the criteria for determining which 
feature to be located at the root of the tree, lets assume that this feature is the KHT 
of A, for the case of the hypothetical password used for our illustrations. Of the three 
possible values that can be assumed by the KHT of A, the algorithm sets the largest 
(i.e., A : Vi, corresponding to the most frequent bin) as the output of feature A  at 
this stage. The next output to be set is that of the KHT of B, located at the level 
just below the root node. Of the three possible values, B  : Vi, B  : V2 and B  : V3  
that can be assumed by the KHT of B, the algorithm then selects the one which
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maximizes the conditional probability, P (B  =  B  : Vn | A  =  A : V\), for n = 1,2,3. 
This process continues down the tree, with the output at each tree level being based 
on the conditional probabilities between the possible outputs at the particular tree 
level, and the current output at the level just above.
The first guessing attempt is realized when the enumeration process first reach­
es the leaves of the tree. We define a guessing attempt as a set whose cardinality equals 
the number of levels in the feature enumeration tree, with every element in the set 
being an output of a  feature from a different level of the tree. For our hypothetical 
example, the first guessing attem pt could for instance take up the values in the set 
Gi = (A : V\, B  : Vs, A B  : V3, B A  : Vi), where the four elements of the set respectively 
correspond to the outputs of the KHT of A, KHT of B, KIT of A B  and KIT of BA. 
These four elements of G\ are represented on the graph by the path indicated by the 
sequence of short arrows.
Each subsequent guessing attem pt follows by modifying the output of a single 
feature in the current guessing attempt. These feature output modifications start 
from the features located at the leaves, and recurse up the tree, using conditional 
probabilities to guide decision making in the way already described.
For instance, assuming P (B A  =  B A  : V2 \ A B  =  A B  : V3) > P (B A  =  B A  : 
V3 | A B  =  A B  : V3), the second guessing attem pt will be G2 =  (A : Vi, B  : V3, A B  : 
Vz,BA  : V2), while the third guessing attem pt will be G 3  =  (A : V \ ,B  : V3, A B  : 
Vz,BA  : V3). Meanwhile, the next three guessing attempts will see the output of 
feature A B  modified to a new value, and the output of feature B A  again iterated
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through its three possible values in accordance with the earlier described conditional 
probability-based criteria.
Observe that between the first and third guessing attem pts (Gx through G3), 
the first three feature outputs (i.e., A : V i ,B :  V3 , A B  : V3 ) are unchanged, while the 
lowest feature (KIT of BA) sees three different outputs. A direct consequence of tree 
traversal techniques such as the one we employ, this trait means th a t a wrong output 
for the KHT of A, or KHT of B, or KIT of AB , will have a negative impact on all 
guesses G\ through (?3, while a wrong output for the KIT of B A  will only impact the 
individual associated guess. This problem generalists to all other guessing attempts, 
and is such that a wrong output for a feature located close to the root will result in 
a  greater amount of fruitless feature space enumeration than a wrong output for a 
feature located at the leaves of the tree.
Since authentication systems impose limits on the number of permitted false 
authentication attempts, its crucial that the tree design minimizes the extent of fruit­
less search space enumeration. Our tree exploits information on the discriminability 
of features to handle this problem. Specifically, we ensure that the weaker (less 
discriminative) features are located towards the root of the tree while the powerful 
(more discriminative) features are located closer to the leaves of the tree. For two 
features f \  and / 2 , we locate the feature f x above the feature / 2  in the tree if the 
mean Battacharrya distance of f x across the population is greater than that of / 2. The 




The choice of string lengths used for the attacks was based on two factors. 
First, the summary statistics in [6 ], indicate that past fixed text keystroke studies have 
for the most part used strings ranging from 6  to 17 characters in length. Because we 
needed our results to be easily put in the context of past findings, we decided to attack 
this same range of string lengths. The second consideration behind our choice of string 
lengths was the need to attack strings whose lengths are representative of the password 
lengths being used today, as this would give a  good reflection of the performance of a 
password-KD system under a statistical attack in the current Internet setting. W ith 
regard to this factor, we studied various recently hacked password lists from which 
we observed average password lengths of about 6.62 to 7.88 characters [20]. We 
took these average password lengths as some sort of password-length lower bound 
and attacked substrings of length 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17 and 20. This large number of 
password strings will help give a concrete view of how statistical attacks may perform 
over a wide range of string lengths.
5.4 Keystroke Verifiers
To evaluate the success of the synthetic attack, we used the Z-score [6 ], Scaled 
M anhattan [6 ] and Naive Bayes [5] verification algorithms. The first two were among 
the best performers in a study that compared up to 14 different fixed text KD verifiers 
[6 ], while the third, despite not being part of the algorithms compared in [6 ], is very 
popular in machine learning literature, readily available in the Weka machine learning 
tool [67], and was recently shown in [5] to perform very well for the kind of fixed text
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heterogenous feature vectors used in this work. We implement the first two verifiers 
from scratch and use the Weka implementation of the Naive Bayes classifier. A brief 
description of each of the three verifiers follows:
5.4.1 Z-score Classifier
Given feature vectors extracted from a user’s keystroke data for a given string 
over several typing runs, this verifier computes the mean and standard deviation 
of each feature during the training phase. In the test phase, the absolute Z-score 
between each feature of the test vector, and the corresponding feature in the mean 
vector (created during the training phase) is computed. The anomaly score is a count 
of how many z-scores exceed 1.96. If a* is the test value, and 6 * and s* are the mean 
and standard deviation of feature i as seen during training, the z-score is computed 
as z  =  (|flj -  bi\/si).
5.4.2 Scaled M anhattan Classifier
This verifier uses a Manhattan-distance computation in which each dimension 
is scaled by the average absolute deviation seen for each feature during the training 
phase. In the training phase, the mean and the mean absolute deviation for each 
of the features are computed. In the test phase, the anomaly score is computed as 
Sf= 1  — bl\/yl where at and bi carry the same meaning as in the z score classifier, 
and tji is the average absolute deviation of feature i during training.
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5.4.3 Naive Bayes Classifier
During training, the verifier builds a user’s model using maximum likelihood 
estimation. In the test phase, it makes a classification decision basing on the probabil­
ity that a given set of latencies belongs to the user. Due to space limitations and the 
fact that the Naive Bayes verifier is well studied in literature, the reader is referred 
to [44] for details on its mechanism and underlying assumptions.
5.5 Performance of the Attack
5.5.1 Overview:
To launch the attacks, we used templates from 110 users who participated 
in at least 3 of the data collection phases. For each of the 110 users, we used data 
from the first phase of our experiments for training1, and then used 30 instances 
of the user’s data from the other typing phases to attack the user’s model so as to 
generate the user’s genuine scores. To generate the impostor scores, we launched 
impostor attempts in 2 different ways. In the first approach, we used 50 randomly 
selected impostors from a pool of 1 0 0 0  users to attack the template (or model) built 
for each user during training. Throughout the rest of the section, we shall refer to 
this attack as a zero-effort attack [9], since it simulates an impostor who makes no 
effort to imitate the genuine user’s way of typing. In the second approach, we used
50 of the top 1000 guesses generated by our attack algorithm to conduct impostor
1Unlike the first two classifiers, the Naive Bayes classifier requires instances of both the positive 
and negative classes during training. For each participant we used as many instances of the negative 
class as the participant had for the positive class during the first phase of our experiments.
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attacks against each user. We shall interchangeably use the terms algorithmic attack 
and statistical attack to refer to this form of attack.
The performance analysis in this section will focus on the comparison between 
these two attacks, since our principal aim is to illustrate how our algorithmic attack 
compares to the well known zero-effort attack which is still the benchmark for the 
performance evaluation of keystroke dynamics systems. Central to our performance 
evaluation methodology is the Equal Error Rate (EER), a measure which represents 
the point at which a verifier’s false-reject and false-accept errors are equal. The 
EER is often used to evaluate biometrics system performance [6 , 9], and is such that 
a  low EER is synonymous with good performance, while a  high EER implies poor 
performance of a system. Some researchers prefer to express EER values on a scale 
running from 0 to 100 [7]), while others use a scale running from 0 to 1 [6 ]. In this 
work, we adopt the latter convention.
To calculate a  user’s EER for a  given type of attack, we construct a Detection 
Error Tradeoff (DET) curve for the user, from which we determine the EER as the 
point at which the curve meets the line y=x (i.e., point at False Reject Rate (FRR) 
equals the False Acceptance Rate (FAR)). Figure 5.2 illustrates this procedure for a 
certain user for both the zero-effort and algorithmic attacks. The profile under attack 
was built for a 7-character string, and the algorithm used for verification was the NaiVe 
Bayes algorithm. As indicated by the figure, this particular user’s performance was 
negatively impacted by the algorithmic attack, given the high EER for this attack 
relative to the zero-effort attack. For each of the seven string lengths used in this 
study, we carry out this procedure for all 110 users and 3 verifiers, and eventually
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compute the mean EER and standard deviation of EERs over the population for the 








—  Algorithmic 
 FRR=FAR
F ig u re  5.2: DET curves computed for the zero-effort and algorithmic attacks
launched against one of the users in our experiments.
5.5.2 G lobal Im p a c t o f th e  A ttack :
Below, we describe the major attributes of the of the attacks with regard to
the general behavior seen across the population.
1. Variance in EERs across the population:—  For all verifiers and string lengths,
the algorithmic attack always caused a much higher variance in the average
EERs than the zero-effort attack (see Figure 5.3)2. Because reliable systems
are typically designed to have low variance in their performance metrics [6 8 ],
this increment in the variance of EERs, irrespective of whether the mean EERs
were affected or not, is the first indicator of why the algorithmic attack is a
major threat relative to the zero-effort attack. Further investigations into the
cause of this high variance (results not shown due to space limitations) revealed
2 The error-bars indicate a single standard deviation from above and below the mean EER. Also 
note that the EERs plotted on the graph have only been computed for password lengths of 7, 9, 11, 
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F ig u re  5.3: Mean performance of the Naive Bayes, Z-score and Scaled M anhattan 
classifiers under the algorithmic and zero-effort attacks.
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that under the algorithmic attack, there was a small proportion of the user- 
population which saw almost zero EERs and another small proportion which saw 
EERs almost close to 1. This kind of extreme behavior was not as pronounced 
under the zero-effort attack, and naturally accounted for the higher variance 
under the algorithmic attack. Regarding the cause of this high disparity in user 
behavior under the algorithmic attack, the population statistics-based nature 
of the attack indicates that the well performing users had their typing traits 
distinct from those of the general population, while the weak users’ group had 
characteristics very similar to those of the population.
2. Mean EERs across the population:— For all verifiers and string lengths, the 
algorithmic attack caused higher mean EERs than the zero-effort attack. The 
long error bars associated with the algorithmic attack cause us to use a wide 
scale (that unfortunately seems to dim the clarity of these EER changes), 
however, Table 5.1 captures this behavior so well as it indicates th a t the EER 
increments ranged from 0.11 for the 7-character string and the Naive Bayes 
verifier, to 0.03 for the 20-character string and the Scaled M anhattan classifier. 
While it may be tempting to write off these EER increments as trivial, they 
are quite high, as they constitute a large percentage of the EERs seen under 
the zero-effort attack. Observe for instance that the Naive Bayes verifier sees 
increments of over 50% of the zero-effort EER, while the other two verifiers see 
increments of over 30% of the zero-effort EERs for all string lengths. As a final 
note on why these EER increments should represent a major threat in the sense 
of a (keystroke) biometrics system, the reader is referred to [6], where an EER
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difference of just 0.075 separated the top ten verifiers in a study in which several 
verifiers were compared.
T able 5.1: EER increments caused by the algorithmic attack.
S trin g
Size
K D  V erification  A lgo rithm



















7 0.105 72.5 0.131 67.1 0.091 67.8
9 0.061 53.5 0.062 30.1 0.063 54.3
11 0.093 80.4 0.063 35.9 0.052 39.8
13 0.081 76.7 0.054 33.8 0.045 45.6
15 0.076 84.4 0.038 28.6 0.041 37.7
17 0.068 66.7 0.037 33.1 0.039 40.2
20 0.062 73.2 0.048 44.5 0.033 35.5
3. Impact of string length:— As the string lengths increased, the increments in 
mean EER caused by the algorithmic attack for the most part saw a monotonic 
decrement (save for 2 cases). The observed reduction in the impact of the attack 
suggests tha t free text keystroke systems, by virtue of using long blocks of text 
for verification could see much lower, or even no increment in EER, under the 
kind of algorithmic attacks implemented in this paper.
5.5.3 Effect o f th e  A ttack  on  th e  P erfo rm an ce  of In d iv id u a l U sers:
Having compared the mean system performance under the two attacks, we 
proceeded to investigate the extent to which the algorithmic attack improved or 
worsened each user’s performance relative to the zero-effort attack. For this analysis, 
we subtracted each users EER under the zero-effort attack from that under the 
algorithmic attack and plotted a CDF of these differences.
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Figure 5.4 shows the full distribution of the EER changes for the 7 and 20 
character strings over the population of users subjected to the two attacks. We focus 
on the two extreme string lengths because they reflect and (or) bound the general 
behavior exhibited across all string lengths. Highlights from this figure are discussed 
below:
1. EER Variations of Individual Users:—The EERs of different users were im­
pacted markedly differently by the attacks. While some users saw performance 
improvement (reduced EERs) under the algorithmic attack, others saw consid­
erably large increments in their EERs. For instance, under the Naive Bayes 
verifier (Figure 5.4a), about 40% of the population saw improved EERs (EER 
differences less than zero) under the algorithmic attack for both the 7 and 20 
character strings, while about another 20% for the 7 character string, and over 
15% for the 20-character string saw no change at all in their EERs. Meanwhile, 
about 5% of the population saw EER increments greater than 0.5 for the 7 
character string, while an even smaller number saw a similar increment for the 
20-character string. This variation in users’ behavior is seen across all verifiers 
and string lengths used for our study, and again points to the earlier mentioned 
trait of certain user clusters being very similar to the population, while others 
are very dissimilar to it. Additionally, the fact that a  small group of users 
seem to be responsible for the increment in mean system EER suggests that a 
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(c) CDF of the changes in EER caused by the algorithmic attack 
against the Scaled Manhattan verifier for each of the 110 users
F ig u re  5.4: Effect of the algorithmic attack relative to the zero-effort attack for 
individual users.
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2. Impact of String Length:—Figure 5.4 shows that the proportion of users whose 
change in EER exceeded zero was higher for the 7 character string than for the 
20 character string across all verifiers. This observation explains the monotonic 
decrease in mean EER with increased string length that we highlighted earlier 
in the discussion since the small proportion of users with increased EERs for 
the long strings should naturally result into lower mean EERs for such strings.
CHAPTER 6 
ROBOTIC IMITATIONS OF TOUCH GESTURES
6.1 Overview
Touch-based authentication—now widely studied for its potential to serve 
as a second layer of defense to the PIN lock mechanism on mobile devices—has 
traditionally been evaluated under the assumption of naive (zero-effort) adversaries. 
The zero-effort threat model, although well understood not to be representative of the 
state-of-the-art threats [69], is for several reasons fronted by researchers as being able 
to sufficiently capture the threat that a touch-based authentication system would face 
in practice. For instance in one of the recent papers on touch biometrics, Frank et 
al. [10] make the following arguments to rule out the need for stringent penetration 
testing of their system:
.... we can hardly imagine someone learning the touch behavior of 30 
features, such as pressure, distribution of acceleration, etc., just by looking 
over the shoulder [10].
...A more successful but more involved attack would be to place a malware 
application on the user’s device. This malware could learn and report the 
touch pattern if  the details of how to compute the features are known to
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the attacker... However, we argue that a user with malware on the device 
has already lost the race against the attacker [10].
These arguments—echoed in many other papers—are sound without doubt. 
Notably though, the notion that these two attacks (malware and a  form of shoul­
der surfing) represent the full spectrum of threats that the system could face is 
for several reasons debatable. In this chapter we demonstrate that: 1) a simple 
robotic/mechanical device (as opposed to malware) can very effectively degrade the 
performance of a touch-based authentication system, and, 2) publicly accessible touch 
biometrics data (such as the data at [70]) can be leveraged to drive the attacks 
even where detailed information about the intended victim’s swiping behavior is not 
available.
The chapter covers our data collection experiments, attack design and results 
of the robotic attack.
6.2 Data and Features Used for our Investigations
6.2.1 Data Collection Process
We conducted two data collection experiments using two Android applications 
that captured the way in which users touched the mobile phone screen. The gestures 
that users typically perform on a touch screen include zooming (in and out), clicking 
(tapping), swiping to switch between screens (i.e., horizontal swiping) and swiping to 
move a page up and down (vertical swiping). The tap gesture does not hold enough 
information to strongly separate between a  large group of users [10], while the zoom
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gesture does not occur frequently enough to guarantee tha t a continuous authenti­
cation application will always have enough data to make classification decisions [10]. 
For these reasons, most work on continuous touch-based authentication hinges around 
the two swipe gestures1. We focus on these two gestures in this work.
For each of a set of points on a touch stroke registered on the screen during 
swiping, the applications recorded the: 1) x and y coordinates, 2) time at which the 
finger touched the point in question, 3) area occluded between the finger and the 
screen, 4) pressure exerted on the screen and 5) orientation of the phone (portrait or 
landscape). The two Android applications basically simulated how users read text and 
view images on the touch screen. Based on a short paragraph of text or an image, users 
had to answer several questions by selecting one of two to four alternative answers that 
we provided per question. On reading a question, each user would scroll/swipe back 
to the image or block of text containing clues to the solution, before scrolling/swiping 
towards the answer section where the user would select one of the choices provided.
Both applications were based on the same idea, although each application 
was based on a different set of questions/images. In the first phase of experiments 
(Session I), users interacted with one application. They then returned on another day 
at their convenience to interact with the second application (i.e., during Session II). 
All participants used the same brand of phone—the Google Nexus S running Android 
version 4.0—so as to avoid bias in our findings that might be caused by differences
in the way in which different phones extract information from touch gestures.
xLi et al. [11] used the tap gesture in conjunction with the two swipe gestures. However they 
found that it had very poor discriminability.
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6.2.2 Feature Extraction and Preprocessing
Before extracting features from the data, we performed an outlier filtering 
step to eliminate very short strokes since these likely originated from click events (or 
taps), as opposed to swiping (scrolling). Frank et al. [10] performed a similar step 
on users’ strokes before proceeding with the classification process. Having removed 
outliers, we extracted 28 features from each stroke. There is currently no universal 
feature-set that researchers use to represent a distinct stroke. For example, Frank 
et al. [10] defined 30 features and discarded 3 of them after feature analysis, Li et 
al. [11] defined 13 features (or 14 features if the x and y coordinates of a point are 
considered as distinct features) and discarded 4 of them after feature analysis while 
Feng et al. [12] used 53 features. For this work we used 28 features that we believe 
best summarize the statistical attributes of a touch stroke. A description of how we 
computed these features follows:
Using the pressure and area readings at different points along a stroke, we 
respectively built a pressure vector, P , and an area vector, A, to represent the pressure 
and area associated with the stroke. We computed the velocity between every pair 
of consecutive points along a stroke, and used these values to generate the velocity 
vector, V. Finally, for every pair of points in V, we computed the acceleration, and 
generated an acceleration vector, A'.
For each of the four vectors A, P , V  and A ', we computed five measures 
to summarize a user’s mean behavior, variability in behavior and extreme behavior 
along a stroke. These were: 1) lower quartile, 2) second quartile, 3) third quartile, 
4) mean, and, 5) standard deviation. This gave a total of 20 (=4x 5) features per
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stroke. The last 8  features making up a vector representing a stroke were: the x and 
y coordinates of the starting points, the x and y coordinates of the end points, the 
distance between the end and starting points of a stroke, the time taken to complete 
the stroke, the tangent of the angle between the line joining the end-points of a stroke 




We assume an adversary who gets physical access to a phone for which touch- 
based continuous authentication is the only active layer of defence. In practice, this 
scenario may arise for an attacker who : 1) breaks the PIN lock mechanism {e.g., using 
methods such as those in [25, 26]), or, 2) finds a  phone in which the PIN lock has been 
disabled temporarily {e.g., a user who sets a very long timeout for the PIN lock), or, 
3) finds a phone in which the PIN lock has been completely disabled by the owner [10]. 
To be able to determine the amount of extra security that touch-based continuous 
authentication adds to the standard PIN lock in the worst case, we believe that these 
assumption must necessarily be made. Also see [71], for an investigation in which a 
similar assumption (i.e., that the adversary has access to the victim’s password) was 
made in order to enable rigorous evaluation of the security of Randomized Biometric 
Templates (RBTs).
63
In the attack itself, the attacker will seek to view private information on the 
phone {e.g., emails, pictures, etc.,) without triggering the anomaly detection mecha­
nism. The attack thus basically proceeds by scrolling/swiping through documents on 
the phone. In practice we believe that the attacker could even assist the robot during 
certain operations {e.g., occasionally clicking at a challenging location), since the 
anomaly detector will most likely not be sensitive enough to detect a few anomalous 
clicks. Next we discuss the underlying statistical observations tha t drive the attack, 
and the details of the mechanical and algorithmic design of the robot.
6.3.2 How do People Swipe on the Phone?
To design the attacks, we first examine the way in which people swipe in 
general. How random is swiping behavior across a population ? Are there certain 
distinct traits that manifest frequently across a large number of users? This section 
provides answers to these and related questions. Due to space limitations, we only 
present results on the pressure exerted on the screen, the area between the finger and 
the screen and the region of the phone at which most swiping is done. Other measures 
such as the time interval between consecutive swipes, the velocity of the finger and 
the length of a stroke, to mention but a few, are left out here but will be used in the 
attack design.
Location of Swiping Activity. Figure D.12 shows the density of touch strokes 
captured at different positions of the phone screen during the first phase of exper­
iments. The dark blue color corresponds to regions which saw very little or no 
swiping/scrolling activity while a high intensity of red corresponds to regions which
0 100 200 300 400 0 100 200 300 400
X  X
(a) Spatial distribution of swiping activity (b) Spatial distribution of swiping activity 
during vertical swiping. during horizontal swiping.
F ig u re  6 .1 : Color map showing the spatial distribution of touch strokes on the phone 
screen.
saw a lot of swiping. The phone was being used in portrait mode when the strokes 
were generated. Note that the coordinate system used on the figures is different from 
that used by the Android system. Observe (Figure D.12a) that the vast majority 
of vertical strokes generated by our user population originated from points having X 
values in the neighborhood of 300 units, and terminated at a position with an X value 
of close to 400 units (and vice versa). Notably, this region of high activity comprises 
less than 50% of the screen display. The heart of the red region (which tends towards 
black) occupies an even a much smaller portion of the screen. Similar traits (see 
Figure D.12b) were seen with the horizontal swiping.
Based on evidence provided through this plot, an adversary with access to 
general population statistics could potentially significantly narrow down the scope of 
features such as: 1 ) the x coordinate of the start point of a stroke, 2 ) the y coordinate 
of the start point of a stroke, 3) the x coordinate of the end point of a stroke, 3) the
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y coordinate of the end point of a stroke, and, 4) the direction of the end-to end line, 
among other features. These features represent a good proportion of the features 
used to characterize users’ touch gestures in past research (such as in [1 0 , 1 1 ]), and 
will also be used in this study.
Regarding the cause of the clustering tendency, our conjecture is tha t the high 
density of strokes on the right side of the screen (i.e., taking the case of vertical swiping 
for instance) was likely because the majority of users are right handed, tending to 
hold the phone in the right hand and swiping with the thumb, or holding the phone 
in the left hand and swiping using one of the fingers on the right hand. In any of 
these two scenarios, a user is very likely to swipe in the manner reflected in the figure. 
We do not rule out the possibility that certain highly specialized applications could 
depict variations from the pattern shown in the figure. In this case we argue that a 
committed attacker who has interest in breaking into such an application could easily 
make research on the swiping trends for such an application.
Finger Area and Pressure on the Screen: Figure 6.2a shows the distribution 
of the mean area touched by the finger and the mean pressure exerted on the screen 
across a subset of our full user population. To plot the figures, we computed each 
user’s mean area (and mean pressure) and plotted the results on the CDF. Observe 
that over 80% of the population had a mean area of between 0.1 and 0.25 and that 
about 50% of the population had mean pressure values of between 0.4 and 0.6. These 
user proportions already suggest that a large number of users could be clustered 
around a narrow band of values (for both pressure and area). To get a more concrete 
insight into the possible clustering of users’ profiles, we studied the variability seen by
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users for each of these two variables. Particularly, we computed the standard deviation 
of the mean area and mean pressure exhibited by each of the users represented in 




















(a) Distribution of mean pressure and area (b) Distribution of standard deviation of pres- 
across the population. sure and area across the population.
F ig u re  6.2: CDFs expressing the mean and variability of area and pressure across 
the population.
Taking the case of pressure for instance, the figure shows that about 40% of the 
population had a standard deviation of over 0.15. Assuming users’ pressure values 
follow a Gaussian distribution, a user with a standard deviation of 0.15 could see 
her/his biometric pattern fall on a band having a width of up to 0 . 6  units (i.e., 2  
standard deviations on either side of the mean). Given such a wide span, an input 
selected from the earlier mentioned clustered regions (Figure 6.2a) could have a good 
chance of falling within such a user’s feature range.
Similar observations made for the other features (e.g., velocity, length of 
strokes, start point of stroke, etc.) further prompted us to believe that generic 
information from the population could possibly enable us to implement a  lethal attack 
on a touch-based authentication system.
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6.3.3 Mechanical and Algorithmic Design of Robot
Fabrication of the “Finger”: We had three main design considerations regard­
ing the object to be used to touch the screen. These were: 1) the object had to be 
able to register touch events on the capacitative screen, 2 ) it had to easily match 
the finger surface area as needed, 3) it had to be soft to avoid damaging the screen, 
and 4) it had to be made from cheap, domestically accessible materials. The fourth 
point rules out technologies such as prosthetics [72] that despite guaranteeing artificial 
fingers that match many of the properties of a human finger, would make the attack 
implementation expensive, and likely defeat our aim of demonstrating how easily the 
attack can be launched based on materials that are cheaply available off the shelf.
To address all four points we fabricated the finger surface from play-doh [73], 
a malleable compound that children use to model different kinds of play-objects. 
Although play-doh on its own was (to our surprise) able to register touch points on 
the screen, we housed it inside a touch screen glove (see [74]) in order to have more 
close control of the “finger” area touching the screen. The small Play-doh lump was 
fastened to the extreme end of a blunted steel nail to ensure firm contact between the 
“finger” and the phone screen.
In all experiments we set our “finger” area to be approximately 0.15 units, 
which was the mean value we observed across our user population. The area setting 
itself was manual—we iteratively molded the play-doh and tested it on the phone 
(during preliminary experiments) until the area value stabilized at around 0.15 units. 
When the motors pushed the play-doh against the touch screen during scrolling, the 
play-doh, owing to its softness, would see some amount of deformation. These small
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variations in play-doh touch surface area did not affect our attack that much, since 
human fingers also see variations in area along the path of a stroke.
Perhaps one interesting observation worth noting here is that when we con­
nected a  battery (AA type) to the play-doh during the attack, the area registered 
on the phone screen increased. A possible reason for this is tha t the effective area of 
contact between the screen and the phone is not only dependent on the physical area 
of contact between the two, but, it also depends on the extent of electrical contact 
between them. We leveraged this property to introduce changes in the “finger” area 
during the experiments.
Robot Components and Attack Algorithm: The basic idea behind our attack 
is for the finger to stroke the screen in such a way that matches the average user’s 
behavior. Based on population statistics therefore, the finger has to be set to: 1) move 
at a certain average speed, 2 ) move in some general direction at a certain region of the 
phone, and 3) exert a certain average pressure on the phone, to match the average 
user. Compared to some of the tasks that Lego robots have been programmed to 
do in the literature (see [75] for an example), designing a Lego to attain the above 
four targets is obviously a much more straightforward problem. We stress that the 
focus of our work is not to push at the boundaries of Lego design, but rather to 
illustrate that a very cheap robot running a very simple algorithm (that could easily 
be implemented by a novice attacker) is a much more rigorous penetration testing 
tool for touch-based authentication systems than the current state-of-the-art methods. 
While we take some steps to minimize the likelihood that the attack could be very 
easily thwarted, the question of the most sophisticated robotic design that could be
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used for this kind of attack is not of interest in this work. In fact, depending on the 
value of the resource to be retrieved from the phone, the attacker could potentially 
use a more sophisticated robot (e.g., the NAO [76]) and hence a  different design 
philosophy. We leave all such investigations for future research after highlighting the 
impact of a robotic attack based on the very bare minimum resources. Figure 6.3 
depicts the robot design.
F ig u re  6.3: Mechanical design of the robot.
The main components used to build the robot are: 2 NXT Intelligent bricks, 
3 motors, 4 gears, 4 wheels and the “finger” . One of the Intelligent bricks serves as
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the CPU of the system while the second one helps prevent the robot from toppling 
over due to weight imbalances (also see Figure C .l, Appendix C). Motor C moves 
the pen (or robot finger) on and off the phone screen while motors A and B move the 
pen along the surface of the screen. The shape of the touch stroke is determined by 
the movement of motors A and B which run concurrently. Motor A drives the robot 
along a straight path while motor B, via a set of gears (see gear setup in Figure C.2, 
Appendix C) drives the framework supporting the robot “finger” along a circular path 
centered about the axis labeled R. To ensure that the robot does not deviate from the 
(approximately) straight path and get out of position (away from the phone region of 
interest), we connected it to a beam whose movement was restricted between a pair 
of rails firmly screwed on the board.
Based on observations on our dataset, most users’ strokes deviate very slightly 
from a straight path. Because our attack seeks to mimic general user behavior (as 
opposed to the traits of an individual user), our robot was designed to generate 
near-straight strokes, with just a slight amount of curved behavior. Bar any effects 
arising out of the mechanical interactions between robot components, our mechanical 
and algorithmic design of the robot seeks to generate a straight stroke, with a very 
slight amount of curvature at a section of the stroke. Figure 6.4 (see Figure 6.4b in 
particular) illustrates the philosophy behind the curved section of our stroke. The 
combination of a motor driving the pen along a curved trajectory (i.e., the arc labeled 
AB) and a motor driving the pen along a straight line (i.e., path labeled CD) results 




(a) Design Philosophy #1: To generate a stroke, two motors run one after 
the other (i.e., serially). One motor makes a horizontal displacement, the 
other makes a vertical displacement. The x represents the points on the 
physical path which are sampled by the Android system to represent a 
stroke. The low sampling rate used by the Android OS (an average of 15 
ms per sample in our experiments) guarantees that the system is blind 
to the true shape of the stroke since a few points on each segment are 
registered by the system.
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(b) Design Philosophy #2: To generate a stroke, two motors rim concur­
rently. The final trajectory (e.g., EF) is a result of the superposition of 
the two motor movements (e.g., AB and CD).
F ig u re  6.4: Philosophy behind the curved behavior of a touch stroke.
In our earlier design (see Figure 6.4a and (or) [77]), we used a different philos­
ophy for the generation of a stroke. In that design, the mechanical and algorithmic 
implementation of the attack were such that the two motors controlling the shape of 
the stroke run sequentially at right angles to each other to form the zig-zag (or close to 
zig-zag) pattern that was our source of curvature. The coarse touch stroke sampling 
rate (~  15 ms on average) on our Google Nexus phones ensured that the Android 
system was “blind” to the precise shape of the stroke. While the design was sufficient
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to illustrate the impact of the attack for our set of inputs, a generalized robotic 
attack based on that design could (in theory and possibly in practice) be thwarted 
in several ways. For example, an increment in the rate at which the Android system 
samples touch points on the screen would potentially expose the zig-zag shape of 
the stroke. Because humans don’t  typically generate zig-zag strokes, detection of 
the zig-zag pattern would be a key indicator for the possible occurrence of an attack. 
Alternatively a sensor (such as an accelerometer or gyroscope) could be used to detect 
repeated instances of a vibration pattern resulting from the zig-zag movement of the 
robotic finger executing several strokes.
Depending on the exact attack setup, exploiting these theoretical weaknesses 
in practice may not necessarily be be trivial, especially given that we used a small 
number of very short vertical and horizontal steps to create the saw-tooth shape. 
We however still move to eliminate this theoretical weakness by using the design 
represented by Figure 6.4b for this dissertation. Note though that the final stroke 
will not always be as smooth as trajectory EF due to the mechanical dynamics of the 
robot components.
It is noteworthy that owing to mechanical factors {e.g., vibrations, friction, 
variations in the shape and size of the play-doh, etc.), the strokes produced by either 
approach can have notable variations from the behavior stipulated by the algorith- 
m. W ith meticulous mechanical design of the robot however {e.g., through careful 
selection of members, balancing weights, firmly securing vibrating elements, etc.), 
this behavior can be minimized. We implemented the attack using the Lego NXT
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Mindstorms IDE [21] due to its straightforward support for motors with dissimilar
inputs running in parallel.
Figure 6.5 depicts a  graphical model of how the motors generate a single stroke.
Motors B and C are connected in series with each other (i.e., they don’t run at the
same time), and their channel connected in parallel with that of Motor A. At the
extreme ends of a stroke, the algorithm is such that the “finger” (see Motor C) is not
in contact with the phone because the breaking (and in some cases starting) of the
robot is associated with momentum effects which may cause a distorted pattern on
the screen. The “finger” only moves towards the phone screen (see downward arrow
-  Motor C) after Motor A (which carries the full weight of the robot and hence the
greatest momentum effects) has been in motion for sometime. At the end of a stroke,








F ig u re  6.5: Model for Generation of a Stroke.
74
The exact duration for which the “finger” is in contact with the phone depends 
on the initial position of the “finger” relative to the phone. This is in fact one of the 
manual aspects of the attack, as we adjusted the position of the phone through trial 
and error (e.g., by putting thin material under it) until the pressure that the “finger” 
exerted on the screen during swiping reached our required average2. In practice the 
attacker can use a  phone (other than the one to be attacked) to guide these initial 
settings.
At the end of each stroke, we allowed a pause of about Is in order for any 
existing vibrations to die out before the next stroke was executed. After a number of 
strokes, the robot may drift away from the region of interest since one end of the rails 
was left open to allow for randomness in the exact length of a stroke. To address this, 
we stopped the swiping, and then physically placed the robot back at the region of 
interest. For each of the blocks represented in Figure 6.5, the motors are given power 
and speed inputs (see Table 6.1).
Table 6.1: Parameter settings used for the robotic attack.
Motor Id Power Time
A 70 0.7
B 1 1 2 0 . 2
b 2 1 2 0 . 1
C i 25 0 . 2
C2 70 0 . 2
The time parameters are in seconds while the power parameters are a function
of the voltage applied to the motor. These parameters are in essence just a general
2The Google Nexus S has a slight bulge at one end, so it does not sit perfectly horizontally if 
rested on a flat surface. We tried to compensate for this imbalance by raising one side of the phone 
more than the other.
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guide — a slight change in the experimental conditions could call for changes in 
these inputs. B\ is the first block representing Motor B while B 2 is the second block 
representing Motor B. The same notation is used for Motor C. The power input for 
the upward motion of Motor C is greater than that for its downward motion because 
the motor has to support the “finger” and its attached mechanism during the upward 
movement. For the downward movement, the weight of the “finger” and its parts 
assist the motor instead.
To generate a horizontal stroke, we positioned the phone such tha t the finger 
started around the point with coordinates (363, 541) and moved towards the point 
having the coordinates (145, 588)3. For the vertical strokes, the phone was positioned 
such that the start coordinates were approximately (320,613) and the direction of the 
finger being towards the point (352,400). These values were the means/averages 
observed over a portion of the full user population. Unlike in [77] where we explicitly 
generated noise to cause variations in the different features across different strokes, 
we rely on noise arising out of the mechanical interactions between robot elements as 
our sole source of randomness. The fact tha t the whole robotic framework moves the 
entire length of the stroke introduces a great amount of noise (e.g., due to vibrations 
of the members). We find this noise to be sufficient to ensure that the robotic strokes 
are not exactly similar to each other.
We set the power and time inputs of Motor C to the values tabulated so as
to get pressure outputs of between 0.4 and 0.6 on the phone screen. Depending on
factors such as the area of the finger and the initial position of the finger relative to
3In practice it only moves towards some point in the neighborhood of the point in question.
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the phone, one may have to set different values for these parameters in order to get 
pressure outputs in this range. Like in the case of the finger area (see Section 6.3.3.), 
we not only iteratively set the pressure during initial experiments, but also depended 
on a connected battery to increase the pressure to the required range. To ease the 
task of setting the various attack parameters, we enabled pointer locations (under 
developer options) so as to view the strokes and their associated raw feature outputs 
on the screen during the fine-tuning phase.
6.4 Attack Performance Evaluation
6.4.1 Verification Algorithms
We demonstrate the impact of the attack using a Support Vector Machine 
(SVM) [78] and the k-Nearest Neighbors (k-NN) classifier [79]. We select these two 
verification algorithms because they have recently been shown in [1 1 ] and [1 0 ] to 
perform very well for continuous touch-based authentication. We briefly describe the 
mechanisms of operation of the two algorithms below:
Support Vector Machine: An SVM is a binary classifier which uses a hyper­
plane to separate two data classes in such a way that the margin between the two 
classes is maximized. The margin is the distance between the hyperplane and the 
boundary observations which are also referred to as support vectors. For classes 
that are not linearly separable in a given feature space, it is sometimes necessary to 
map the original data points to a higher dimensional space with the aid of a kernel 
function. We used the Gaussian radial-basis function as our kernel, like was done in
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[10]. During classification, we set a given user’s data as the positive class, and a set 
of samples randomly selected from the other users as the negative class.
k-Nearest Neighbors: During training, this classifier does not have to extract 
any model from the data—it only stores the feature vectors from the different classes 
(in our case two classes). Given a new observation that is to be assigned a  class 
label, the k-NN classifier assigns it to the class A  if the majority of the k closest 
training vectors to the new observation belong to the class A. Different researchers 
use different measures to represent the distance between the training vectors and a 
test observation. In this work we use the Eucledian distance metric since it was also 
used in [10]. Like we did for the SVM, during training, we set a given user’s data 
as the positive class (genuine class), and a set of randomly selected samples from the 
rest of the population as the negative class (impostor class).
For both the k-NN and SVM, we used WEKA [67] via its Java API to 
implement the classification system. We used k=9 for the k-NN classifier since this 
value gave us the best performance. For all other parameters across the two classifiers, 
we used the WEKA defaults.
6.4.2 Training and Testing M ethodology
Training and Zero-effort Testing: Training was done based on data collected 
during Session I  while zero-effort testing was done based on data collected during 
Session II. For each user, we distinguished between portrait and landscape strokes, 
and further distinguished between horizontal and vertical strokes for each of the two 
phone orientations. This way, each user had four reference templates. The reason for
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separating between these four types of strokes was because certain features change 
depending on the type of stroke and the way in which the phone is held when the stroke 
is executed. For example, for the typical user, a horizontal stroke executed in portrait 
mode will very likely have different start and end-points (among other features) from 
a horizontal stroke executed in landscape mode. Owing to the mismatch between 
features, a classification mechanism that does not distinguish between these two types 
of strokes will likely perform unreliably.
In practice we believe that a touch-based authentication application should 
use all four types of reference templates since users can switch between stroke types 
depending on the type and organization of content they read on the phone. Regardless 
of whether a user is biased towards a certain type of stroke, the system should be 
able to accurately perform classification during those times when the user executes 
the other kinds of strokes.
For each of the four categories of strokes, we only performed our analysis for 
those users who executed at least 80 strokes during Session I. For the portrait strokes 
we had 106 and 118 users who met this 80 strokes requirement for the horizontal and 
vertical strokes respectively. For the landscape strokes, we had 41 and 50 users who 
met the requirement for the horizontal and vertical strokes respectively. For training, 
we used 80 strokes executed by the user in question (i.e., genuine or positive class) 
and 5 strokes from each of the other users (i.e., the impostor or negative class) for 
each of the four categories of strokes.
To establish a baseline against which to measure the impact of the robotic 
attack, we carried out zero-effort testing for each user. In these tests, to launch an
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impostor attack against a given user’s template, we used 1 0  strokes from each, of the 
other users. To carry out a genuine attack against a given user’s template, we used 
all the strokes captured from that particular user during Session II. Because a  user 
will every now and then execute a stroke which is very distinct from the rest of her 
strokes, we used a block of strokes, rather than a single stroke to make authentication 
decisions.
Each legitimate or impostor authentication attem pt was based on a single vec­
tor derived from 10 consecutive feature vectors (or strokes). The single authentication 
vector was computed such that its elements were the component-wise means of the 
10 vectors contained in a sliding window. From the results obtained from these tests, 
we generated four Detection Error Tradeoff (DET) curves [80] for each user, one for 
each kind of swiping. From each of these curves, we determined the Equal Error Rate. 
Robotic Testing The robotic testing process was the same as that described in Section 
6.4.2, except that the impostor attack was based on samples generated by the robot. 
We will refer to the impostor attack in this case as the robotic impostor attack. We 
used 600 strokes generated by the robot to carry out this attack against each user. 
Like we did in the zero-effort tests, we again generated two DET curves for each user, 
and calculated the EER from each of the curves.
6.4.3 Attack Results
The Failure to Enroll Policy: To rigorously evaluate the impact of the attack, 
we employed a “failure to enroll’ policy in which we only enrolled users whose mean 
EERs across the two verifiers at baseline were less than a certain EER threshold
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(a)4. Our attack performance evaluation was done at values of a  ranging from 0 . 2  
to 0.08. We chose an upper bound of a=0.2 because we believe that a user with an 
EER higher than that would probably not use the technology anyway. For the lower 
bound we decided to use a=0.08 because the number of users able to enroll on the 
system became too small for values of a  less than that.
Mean Impact of the Attack: Figures 6 . 6  and 6.7 respectively summarize the 
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F ig u re  6 .6 : Impact of the robotic attack on the classification of the horizontal strokes 
generated in portrait mode.
4For each user we computed the EER seen with each of the k-NN and SVM verifiers at baseline
and found the mean of these two values. It is this mean value that we compared with a  in order to 
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F ig u re  6.7: Impact of the robotic attack on the classification of the vertical strokes 
generated in portrait mode.
For different values of a , we computed the mean EER and standard deviation 
of the EERs across the population before and after the robotic impostor attack. 
Figures 6 . 6  and 6.7 respectively summarize these results for the horizontal and vertical 
touch strokes. The bottom (horizontal) axis shows the different EER thresholds (a), 
while the top (horizontal) axis shows the number of users who were able to  enroll onto 
the system at each value of a. Before the robotic attack was launched we obtained 
EERs of between 0.13 and 0.035 (see plots on the left side of Figures 6 . 6  and 6.7). 
These EERs are higher than the EERs reported in [10], but comparable to those 
reported in [1 2 ] during the sub-set of experiments in which the users did not wear
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a digital sensor glove. W ith our baseline EERs5  (i.e., EERs before attack) being 
comparable to the EERs reported in the literature, we proceeded to evaluate the 
impact of the robotic attack.
Observe (Figures 6 .6 b, 6 .6 d, 6.7b, 6.7d) that for both the vertical and horizon­
tal strokes, the attack drastically increased both the mean EERs and the standard 
deviation of the EERs. The high mean EERs indicate that users begin to see very high 
False Reject Rates (FRRs), while impostors see equally high False Acceptance Rates 
(FARs). Also, the high variance in EERs implies that system performance becomes 
very unreliable/unpredictable as a result of the attack. It is noteworthy that the 
heightened EERs and standard deviations persist for both verification algorithms even 
when the system is used only by the best performing users (i.e., a=0.08). This implies 
that a defence mechanism centered around barring the poor users from enrolling onto 
the system would not thwart the attack. Table 6.2 gives a more precise view of the 
impact of the attack on the mean EERs.
T able 6.2: Percentage increment in mean EER due to the robotic impostor attack 
on the portrait strokes.
a SV M k-N N
Horizontal Vertical Horizontal Vertical
0 . 2 377.3% 638.6% 333.8% 382.9%
0.18 407.6% 734.9% 375.7% 405.6%
0.16 479.8% 752.9% 401.2% 475.4%
0.14 486.9% 702.8% 436.2% 583.1%
0 . 1 2 522.2% 1021.7% 509.7% 779.4%
0 . 1 695.4% 1175.8% 691.9% 827.0%
0.08 799.5% 1535.6% 803.3% 863.2%
5See our work in [81] for an in-depth analysis of the baseline EERs of various algorithms.
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The table shows the percentage change in mean system EER seen by each 
verification algorithm as a  result of the attack. Regardless of the verification algorithm 
or failure to enroll threshold, the percentage change in mean EER is beyond 300% in 
all cases, and over 1500% in the most extreme case. These results confirm why 
the robotic attack would significantly degrade the performance of a touch-based 
authentication system.
Impact of the Attack on each User: Figure 6 . 8  summarizes the impact of the 
attack on each user’s verification performance.
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F ig u re  6 .8 : Impact of the attack on each user’s portrait strokes.
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For each user, we subtracted the EER seen under the zero-effort attack from 
that seen under the robotic attack and then plotted the CDFs of these changes in 
EER for each of the two extreme failure-to-enroll thresholds. For this analysis we 
only present results for a=0.2 and a=0.08 since the other values of a  did not give us 
any new insights. The plot reveals two salient features:
1. There was a proportion of users (in some cases up to 30% of the population) 
whose EER changes were negative. For these kinds of users, the robotic attack 
actually performed worse (i.e., caused lower EERs) than the zero-effort attack. 
Since our attack was designed based on data gleaned from the population, this 
trend suggests that there is a proportion of users (say, 30% of the population) 
whose touch gesture biometric footprint is very distinct from that of the majority 
of the users.
2. There was a proportion of users who had EER changes that were extremely 
high (close to 1). These types of users likely had their touch biometric patterns 
very similar to the mean values observed over the population.
These two features to some extent explain the high variance seen in Figures 
6 .6 b, 6 .6 d, 6.7b and 6.7d, since a combination of users seeing decrements in EER and 
others seeing very drastic increments in EER must have resulted into a population 
having very high variability in EER relative to the variability seen before the robotic 
attack. Results obtained with the phone held in landscape mode are left out because 
they did not provide any noteworthy new insights.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this Dissertation we conducted a rigorous pattern analysis on keystroke 
and touch biometrics data and leveraged the observed traits to design a new family 
of attacks that break keystroke and touch authentication systems. We evaluated the 
impact of our algorithmic attack on the best verification algorithms in the keystroke 
and touch authentication fields and compared the performance to that seen with the 
traditional zero-effort attacks.
When subjected to zero-effort impostor attacks, the EERs of the keystroke 
verification algorithms were between 0 . 2  and 0.08 for a set of password strings whose 
lengths ranged between 7 and 20 characters. This range of EERs was comparable 
to the zero-effort EERs reported in the benchmark study in [6 ]. When we launched 
our algorithmic attack, the EERs of the three verifiers increased by between 28.6% 
and 84.4%, relative to the zero-effort EERs. Also, we found that the shorter pass­
words were more vulnerable to the attacks, and that a small proportion of the 
user-population accounted for most of the performance degradation caused by the 
algorithmic attack.
For the touch-based authentication system, the mean EERs of the verification 
algorithms were between 0.08 and 0.035 under the zero-effort attack. This range of
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EERs was comparable to the EERs reported in the literature [12]. When we launched 
our robotic attack, the mean EERs of the verification algorithms increased by between 
333.8% and 1535.6% depending on the failure-to-enroll threshold and type of touch 
stroke subjected to attack. Like was observed with the keystroke attacks, a subset of 
the population resisted the attack, while another subset of users badly succumbed to 
the attack.
In general, the results from our research indicate that in comparison to the 
zero-effort attacks typically used to test keystroke and touch authentication systems, 
our algorithmic attacks were considerably much more lethal. The kinds of synthetic 
attacks presented in this work rest on two premises: 1) The large amounts of keystroke 
and touch biometrics data required to design the attack can be easily accessed by 
committed adversaries, and, 2) The software tools and cheap easily programmable 
robots required to implement the attacks are within the reach of adversaries. From 
evidence cited in this work, these are realistic assumptions, implying that a keystroke 
or touch-based authentication system would have a decent chance of being subjected 
to such a kind of attack in practice.
There are several aspects of our attacks that might need further research. 
First, like most past studies in this area (see works cited in Chapter 2 ), our touch 
biometrics data collection was based on a group of users who used a small number 
of specialized applications (two applications in our case). In practice, people use a 
wide range of applications, some of which are designed for tasks which could prompt 
“touch signatures” (e.g., with regard to regions of the phone tha t people touch) that
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are very different from those seen with our applications. It would be interesting to 
determine how the attack scales to a large number of applications.
Another area worthy of investigation is whether a touch stroke could be 
decomposed into a set of features that are more resilient to this kind of attack 
than our features. Because touch-based authentication does not yet have a standard 
set of features universally used by all researchers, we defined a set of 28 features 
that captured the key statistical attributes exhibited along a stroke. The underlying 
philosophy behind our feature definitions is not so different from that of the features 
used in past work, however, this does not guarantee that all feature-sets will succumb 
to the attack in exactly the same way. It is thus interesting to determine how 
much less or how much more the other features are affected by the attack. Similar 
kinds of questions can be raised about our keystroke attacks — e.g., with regard to 
the variety of keyboards used during data collection, the variety of texts analyzed 
and the question of how the findings relate to free-text keystroke authentication. 
Investigations into the effects of changes in these variables would greatly increase 
the community’s understanding of the extent of the threat posed by these types of 
attacks.
The above open research problems notwithstanding, our attacks highlight pre­
viously unknown threats to keystroke and touch-based authentication. Our findings 
do not only call for more stringent performance evaluation of keystroke and touch- 
based authentication systems, but should also motivate research into technologies 
which could defend against the larger family of robotic and software attacks, two 
instances of which have been demonstrated in this dissertation.
APPENDIX A
CHECKING FOR THE SKEWNESS REQUIREMENT OF 
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F ig u re  A .l :  Skewness of A D f vectors.
In Figure A. la, the A D f vectors are computed such that the features f i  and 
/ 2  forming a pair are both KHTs. For each feature-pair, the associated A D f  vector is 
computed based on a set of 3000 randomly selected user-pairs. Since our test-phrase 
contains 58 KHTs, there are (528) =  1653 possible feature-pairs th a t can be formed 
out of the set of KHTs. We compute a A D / vector for each of these feature-pairs, 
and calculate the skewness value of this A D f  vector. Figure A. la  is a CDF of the 
full array of skewness values obtained across all 1653 KHT feature-pairs. W ith both 
f i  and / 2  being KITs, we repeat the procedure to generate the CDF in Figure A. lb. 
Results on the two plots generally supported the use of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
as all KHT feature-pairs had a A D f  vector with skewness between -0.3 and 0.3, and 
about 95% of KIT feature-pairs had a A D f  vector with skewness between -0.5 and 
0.5.
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For each of the 8  features used to plot the two graphs, we calculate the 
standard deviation exhibited by each user in our population and then generate a 
CDF of the standard deviations. In the context of a statistical attack, high intra­
in question could be matched by a wide range of guesses. For clarity of the plots, 
standard deviations exceeding 40 ms and 100 ms for the KHTs (Figure B .la) and KITs 
(Figures B.lb) respectively, were filtered off before generating the CDFs, since a very 
small proportion of users had standard deviations exceeding these thresholds. The 8  
selected features show the general trend observed across the dataset. Observe that 
different features did not necessarily have similarly shaped distributions, an indication 
of why the adversary would benefit from a feature-by-feature understanding of the 
statistical traits exhibited by keystroke data associated with the password in question.
KHTs over the full population. KITs over the full population.
F ig u re  B .l :  Intra-user variability of KHTs and KITs.





The NXT brick at the far end right provides a balancing moment that prevents 
the robot from toppling over due to the combined weight of the motor and finger- 
support mechanism on the other side of the robot.
F ig u re  C .l :  Aerial view of the robot.
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The gear-pairs are selected in such a way to produce a  low speed and high 
torque to drive the “finger” and its support-mechanism.
F ig u re  C.2: Gear mechanism driving the robot “finger” along a circular arc.
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